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PREFACE 
This Professional Guide is one of a series of technical publica-
tions prepared under the direction of the Office of Civil Defense9 The 
purpose of the Office of Civil Defense Technical Publications Program is 
to assist architects and engineers in the planning an<;i design of structures 
that contain protective features. 
This publication was prepared for the Department of Defense, 
Office of Civil Defense, by the Small Homes Council-Building Research 
Council of the University of Illinois, Rudard A. Jones, Director; Brian J9 
Crumlish, and Donald E9 Brotherson, Principal Investigator and Author. 
Members of the staff of the Small Homes Council-Building Research 
council assisted in the investigation. The firm of Carron-Henneman 
& Associates, Urbana, Illinois, was consulted on certain engineering 
phases of the investigation. 
This publication is presented as an interim edition to meet the 
immediate need of architects and engineers, and to allow the professions 
to contribute their experience for consideration in preparation of the 
final version. Comments should be sent directly to the Engineering 
Se;rvices Division, Office of Civil Defense. 
The Technical Publications Program consists of five categories: 
Professional Manuals present the technology of design 
and construction for protection against weapons effects. 
Professional Guides orient this technology to the incorpora-
tion of protective features into normal-use structures such as 
schools, apartment buildings, and industrial plants. 
Technical Memoranda present subjects not of sufficient 
scope to warrant presentation as a manual or guide. These 
generally consist of performance requirements for shelters and 
shelter components. 
Design Studies present, in general outline form, St\ggested 
designs for incorporating protective features into normal-use 
structures. 
Elli?:ineering Case Studies are engineering reports on the 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 
The Demand for and Characteristics of the 
Parking Garage 
1,. General 
2. The Parking Garage and the City 
3. Current Garage Construction 
Design Standards of the Garage Structure 
1. General 
2. Garage Criteria 
3,. Building Codes 








1. General 3-1 
2. Design Considerations 3-1 
3. Thermal Intensities and Fire Hazard 3-1 
4. Blast Effects 3-3 
5. Nuclear Radiation 3-4 
6. Habitability 3-6 
Incorporation of Protective Features 
1. General 4-1 
2,. Site Considerations 4-1 
3. Space Requirements 4-3 
4. Special Considerations of the Automobile 4-8 
5 .. Structure and Materials 4-10 
6. Openings, Entrances, and Ramps 4-14 
7,. Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 4-17 
Design Examples 
1. General 5-l 
2. Open-Air Type 5-1 
3. Underground Type 5-3 
4. Office Building Base 5-5 
5. Integral Type 5-7 
6. Abovegr ound Type 5- 8 
7. Residential Type 5 ·~10 
B ibHography 
Appendix A Weapons Effects A-1 
Appendix B Glossary of Terms B-1 
Appendix C Regional Offices C-l 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure No. Title page 
4-1 Ramped Entrances 4-15 
5-1 Ground Floor Plan of Building "A" 5-3 
5-2 Typical Floor Plan of Building "A" 5-4 
5-3 Elevation of Building "A" 5-5 
5-4 Section of Building "A" 5-6 
5-5 Street Level Plan of Building "B" 5-9 
5-6 First Basement Level Plan of Building "B" 5-10 
5-7 Section of Building "B" 5-ll 
~-8 Site Plan of Building "C" 5-14 
5-9 Plan at Street Level of Building "C" 5-15 
5-10 Section of Building "C" 5-16 
5-11 Ground Floor Plan of Building "D" 5-18 
5-12 Typical Floor Plan of Building "D" 5-19 
5-13 Elevation of Building "D" 5-20 
5-14 Section of Building "D" 5-21 
5-15 Site Plan of Building "E" 5-24 
5-16 Parking Plan of Building "E" 5-25 
5-17 Section of Building "E " 5-26 
5-18 Plan of Building "F" 5-29 
5-19 Elevation and Section of BuilQ.ing "f" 5-30 
lNTRODUCTION 
:Parking garages deserve special consideration as protective 
structures because, as currently constructed, they have many characteris-
tics that resist the effects of a nuclear detonation. 
A building type introduced to American cities only a few decades 
ago, the parking garage now represents a significapt perc~ntage of new 
downtown construction. As the popularity of automobile trav~l qontinues 
to rise, the need for more parking facilities naturally follows. 
By demand, the parking facilities are easily accessible to the 
main traffic arteries of the urban area and are as close as economically 
poss~ble to the center of the working population and the shopping areas 
of cities--areas where people a r e at some distance froin their home or 
neighborhood shelters. 
It is obvious that garages have some char~qteristics that are 
hi~hly desirable for a protective structure. The wide ramps used tq dis-
tribute automobiles provide easy, generous ~ccess to a ma~s movement 
of people. The relative openness of the plan allows ~high d~gree of 
flexibility in arranging space in emergency conditions. Tl\e struct~u;e is 
frequently both fire resistive and of a massive construction clesirable for 
:radiation attenuation. 
Complete protection against all nuclear effects is gene;rally 
impratical. However, certain degrees of resistance to each effect can 
be developed. 
The prime objective in a good shelter program i~ to protect the 
population. A garage utilizing the principles of mass and geom.e~ry 
shielding could reduce the hazards of rad~oactive fallout to citizens 
shel~ered within. Increased structural resistance and special attention 
to the detailing of openings could reduce the da:p.gerous effects of the 
blast and thermal waves. 
Another objective is to reduce the reconstruction requi:J;ed in a 
post-attack period. Structures with a capacity to withstand thermal and 
blast effects could provide both a shelter during periods of high radio-
aotive fallout and temporary quarters in the event of destruction of 
offices or residences. Eventually, it would revert to its peacetime u13e 
when the emergency situation ended~ In any case, attention sho~ld not be 
limited to structural parts; the mechanical systems should also be designed 
for as nearly an efficient continuous function as possible. 
i 
The additional objective of preserving material goods will also 
assist in relieving the burden on the economy. Protection of goods stored 
would not be a primary consideration in the design of a parking garage~ 
but the availability of some vehicles in an emergency period would be 
helpful. If the structure i s to serve as a fallout shelter or emergency 
housing area, certain emergency goods must be stored and attention 
given to their protection. For example, the sleeping and food supplies 
must be protected from the possibility of ignition from thermal radiation, 
from devastation by blast pressures, and from contamination by radio-
active fallout. 
Many of the problems to be solved are similar to those of other 
structures, and they will not be dealt with in detail. The general emphasis 
in this Guide will be those problems peculiar to the design of a parking 
garage with protective features. In addition to those protective features 
incorporated in the original construction, the designer should be aware 
of the temporary protective measures that may l;>e taken during emergency 
conditions. His design could make them faster , more economical, and more 
efficient. :Wherever possible, hasty measures (those accomplished in a 
few .hours), expedient meas.ures (those r equiring a day or so of prepara-
tion), .and improvised measures (those involving a week or so of construc-
tion) will be pointed \out. 
This Guide does not establish mandatory design criteria. T.he . 
intensity of all nuclear effects on a structure varies independently, 
depending on distance from the detonation, the height and magnitude of 
the explosion, atmospheric and geographic conditions, and so forth. A 
brief description of the phe~omena accompanying a nuclear detonation 
has been prepared by the Office of Civil Defense and is included in this .. 
publication as Appendix A. 
Specific loadings or intensities as established by OCD (such as 
5 psi and 25 psi overpressure resistance qualifying as "limited" and 
"blast" protection, and a minimum protection factor of 100 for fallout) 
are not necessarily implied in the examples. In some cases, the expense 
or complications involved will not allow the struct_ure to fully meet these 
criteria; yet, some protection can be provided. In other cases, higher 
degrees of protection may be gained at a moderate additional cost . 
Garage structures are frequently limited to minimum budgets. 
Throughout this Guide, protective features are carefully considered for 
their effect ,on both the economical and efficient operation of the garage 
in peacetime as well as the advantages gained in i.ts alternate use as a 
protective structuree 
ii 
Certain garage types are inherently better suited for protective 
structures; other types will require the incorporation of special protec-
tive measures. In all cases, inclusion of some protective features should 
be investigated. 
The discussion of cost is kept in a r~lative nature on each fea-
ture, and a detailed cost analysis is not included. For an example of cost 
analysis, the designer should refer to the design studies and engineering 
case studies (OCD DSG 35 series). 
The general emphasis of this Guide is to discuss ideas which the 
architect or engineer may consider in his design of a parking garage. 
It is hoped these ideas will furnish sufficient background to the designer 
so that he is better able to determine the amount and type of protection 
that he may wish to incorporate into a structure. 
As shown in the preface to this Guide, the Office of Civil Defense 
offers publications that will be of value to the arc:Q.itect-engineer in sol-
ving the design problems and answering questions raised in this guide. 
iii 
CHAPTER I 
THE DEMAND FOR AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARKING GARJ\.GE 
1-1 General 
This chapter discusses the demand for parking space as related 
to city planning, population densities and location, and the basic types of 
parking structures emerging from the demand. 
1-2 The Parking Garage and the City 
1-2.1 Parking Demand and City Size 
The par~ing garage is a planning device used to concentrate the 
storage of automobiles in areas of heavy traffic potential. This type of a 
structure occurs most frequently in areas where land costs are high. 
The major purpose of this structure, aside from the storage of automobiles, 
is to gain maximum use from the land. The storage capacity of an expen-
sive parcel of land can be increased as much as ten times by the use of 
:multi-level garages; a dual use of the land may be accomplished by com-
bining a parking garage with another type of structure; or the land may be 
left as open space when an underground garage is built. 
In small cities where the cost of land is low, the areas of dense 
traffic are frequently limited to the vicinity of traffic generators such as 
shopping centers and small businesses. Adequate parking space is usually 
available at the curb in towns with less than 10,000 inhabitants. With the 
growth of a city, however, the street pattern seldom changes and the 
amount of curb parking consequently does not increase. Off-street 
parking spaces begin to appear as the city grows but rarely do economic 
factors demand parking garages before the city reaches a population of 
about 100,000. 
In a pew project, the area devoted to parking depends upon the 
nature of the project. This area often equals or exceeds the area assigned 
to the major function of the pr oject. In residential projects, such as 
private homes, apartments, hotels, and motels, space for one or two cars 
;per unit is customarily provided. Stores and offices require one parking 
space for every 200 to 400 square feet of leasable floor space. In places 
of assembly such as theaters, auditoriums, and churches, the parking 
area frequently exceeds the net area of the structure. 
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1-2.2 Parking as Part of a Coordinated Plan 
Many new structures are, however, erected without regard to 
parking demands or traffic pattern. Small retail merchants are not 
financially able to construct parking structures. Space must be pr ovided 
in privately erected and operated garages or the responsibility must be 
assumed by the city government. When private garages are constructed, 
they are seldom planned with respect to the traffic pattern. More often 
than not, these garages are erected on lower cost land, inconvenient to 
both the major traffic arteries and the destination of the patrons. Cities 
are becoming increasingly aware of this deficiency and are placing less 
reliance on private parking interests to assist in solving the pr oblem. 
Another major factor affecting the parking pattern is the expan-
sion of the rapid transit facilities of a city. The direct effect of an 
efficient rapid transit system -is the diversion of automobile traffic from 
the city center. Consequently, parking spaces must be provided in the 
fringe areas convenient to the transit terminals. 
In order to achieve maximum efficiency, the planning and control 
of parking should be coordinated with the traffic layout, the land use, and 
the rapid transit design. This can be best accomplished by the city. 
The planners of a city also should be concerned with problems of shelter-
ing citizens in the event of an enemy attack. If parking structures are used 
for shelter, Civil Defense activities can be coordinated with the traffic 
design by the planning departments. 
The principal problem in establishing a coordinated parking plan 
is usually the acquisition of land. Private interests occasionally find 
that the tax on structures makes it profitable to demolish older buildings 
and convert land into vacant sites available for parking. In city govern-
ment parking programs, the city often condemns the land, builds the 
parking structure and then leases the facilities to private operators. 
As the need for parking increases, available land becomes 
scarce. Within the central business district, densities are high and the 
land is expensive. This is the hub of commercial activities of the urban 
area--a consolidation of offices and retail shops, frequently surrounded 
by a ring of light manufacturing areas. 
The area generally referred to as the core of the central 
business district, where densities and land costs are highest, occupies 
about one-fourth of the central business ·district. It is the destination 
of the majority of shoppers and workers, but unfortunately contributes 
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.only a ·smaU fraction of the parking facilities at the presen time . Ericour 
~:' aged by high land values9 the pattern of growth in the core has been towards 
taller buildings; which in turn generate more traffic. This traffic even-
-< tually forces .the,-elimination of curb parking and the high land· values 
increase the difficulty of providing off-street parking. 
1-2.3 Parking Structures as Part of New Project8 
This intense problem has produced many creative solutions. As 
a result of planning studies 9 most large cities are programming enormous 
parking facilities in the very heart of the city, conveniently located for 
shoppers and workers. Private interests have also provided excellent 
examples of structures which include built-in parking among their client-
attracting facilities . The schemes are worth examination not only as good 
architecture and as solutions to the parking problem but also for the 
potential they hold a shelter program. 
Among the schemes to provide parking within the city core 9 the 
Seattle plan which proposes a dramatic pedestrian platform covering 
twenty blocks 5 furnishes an excellent example of a well-protected area 
available to thousands of people. The unobtrusive parking, concealed in 
several layers below the surface of the plaza9 returns a dignified aspect 
to a city threatened by the blight of automobile parking. Similarly, in 
Penn Center in Philadelphia, the automobile is skillfully restricted from 
the scene. Here, within the broad, open esplanades of the center, all 
modes of .transportation come together in a single structure, which also 
houses six decks of parking to serve the area. In Rochester 9 the proj~ct 
of revitalizing the city core provides for a 3-story parking garage built 
below grade, with ramps connecting to a surrounding link road, and 
supporting an 18-story tower with banks, stores, offices, restaurants, 
and hotel space. 
Though somewhat smaller in size, the parking innovations pro-
vided by private enterprise are nonetheless imaginative. Private 
parking garages are not uncommon in the central business districts as 
part of office buildings9 apartments, and hotels. 
In Chicago, twin towers containing almost 900 dwelling units 
have a pa-rking space for each unit. on a continuous spiral ramp system on 
the lower ·16 floors. In many large cities, co-op and high-rise apartment 
buildings have ramped underground parking garages. 
Office-building designers have used a variety of schemes to 
provide parking in order to attract clients. A new skyscraper in Montreal 
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is superimposed on a marble-paved, multi-level base which hous~s over 
2,000 cars. An office building in Kansas City has provided parking for its 
tenants in a five-level, aboveground structure joined to the office bujlding 
by a pedestrian bridge. In. New Orleans, where the water table is near the 
ground surface, an elevt\ted plaza screens an "underground" parking 
·garage. 
Urban renewal also furnishes many examples of interesting 
parking structures. Many cities are using renewal schemes as a means 
of providing some relief to the parking problem. Expansive parking 
facilities within a project close to the business district serve both the 
inhabitants of the area and shoppers and business visitors. 
In LaFayette Park in Detroit, a multi-level parking structure 
has been constructed between two 22-story apar tment buildings . . Appear-
ing as a brick-walled horizontal slab, topped by a terrace and swimming 
pool for the 300 f~milies, the structur e conceals 370 cars. 
In the new Carl Sandburg Village in Chicago, no traffic penetrates 
into the housing and shopping center and all parking is underground. The 
considerable extra expense was justified by the creation of an atmosphere 
of quiet. 
The areas surrounding cities provide fewer examples of parking 
structures. Parking garages in fringe areas are not usually successful. 
M;any housing developments provide enclosed parking facilities, but, i~ 
general, parking lots are sufficient. 
In suburban areas, large concentrations of cars occur at shopping 
centers; but, without the pressure of high land costs, parking is usually 
allowed to cover the landscape. Rarely are parking garages provided. 
The chief motive for housing automobiles in the suburbs is not land con-
servation but aesthetics. 
A noteworthy example, which also testifies to the ubiquity of the 
parking garage structure, ~s an office building standing alone on a rolling 
100-~cre site in Connecticutf The elevated square "doughnut" of offices 
surrounds a covered ground-floor garage. The roof of the garage forms 
a landscaped entrance court. This approach solves the vexing problem of 
what to do with employee cars in a rural setting. With the building raised 
above the ground, cars can be parked beneath it, minimizing walking 
distance and providing shelter during bad weather. Unsightly parking 
fields are eliminated so that panoramic views from inside the building, 
already enhanced by elevation, are not interrupted by the usual sea of 
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automobiles. 
1 ~3 Current Garage Construction 
1-3.1 General 
In such a rapidly changing field of design, generali za tion can be 
misleading. However 9 in order to make this guide most useful, some 
attempt has been made to determine which garage characteristics are 
most common in current construction or promise to become so. Dimen-
sional layout of structur s~ fore ample 9 is greatly modified by structural 
innovation and by the constan ly changing dimensions of the automobile. 
Ar ea requirements reflecting these standards may be valid for only a 
few years. 
1-3.2 Garage Type 
Current garage construction may be classified by the location 
within the structure, method of management, or method of interfloo r 
traveL Of these, the location of the parking facilities within the struc-
ture has the mo t influence on the effectiveness of the garage as a shelter, 
but the m nagement and vertical circulation system also have some effect. 
1-3.3 Location Within the Structure 
The most representative commercially operated garage used 
solely for parking is the aboveground structure. This is usually a multi-
level structure and may be either an open-air or closed type .. 
The open-air structure is less vulnerable to blast pressures as 
a r esult of its open construction but would offer the occupants little pro-
tection fr om ther mal, blast, dynamic, and initial radiation effects. 
However, being an abov g round structure that is likely to remain stand-
ing within the destructive area of the blast pressures 9 the upper floors of 
an open-air garage could serve as a fallout shelte r tq relieve crowded 
condition in nearby blast shelters after the initi 1 effects have passed 
if shielding analysis shows that it meets fallout shelter req irement , 
Almost no abov ground enclosed garages are being constructed 
except as integral types where he parking is enveloped by an office 
building or hot 1. The enclosed type could be developed into an excellent 
shelter. It cannot be expected that the xpense involved for massive 
exterior walls, forced ventilation ~ and lighting will be met without some 
1-5 
incentive. This type of structure might be built in those locations wher~ 
the prime motivation is to build a shelter with an alternate use as a park-
ing garage. 
The underground garage structure h~s no operating advantage 
over the aboveground structure. In addition to requiring more light an<;i 
ventilation, construction costs usually exceed that of an aboveground 
garage. As a consequence, this type of solution is used only where under-
ground space can be easily and cheaply acquired. The main advantage i~ 
that the ground surface can remain open for its original use. The under-
ground garage combines the least vulnerability to blast with the best 
thermal and radiation protection. It is uniquely qualified as a shelter. 
Examples of the completely underground type occur in large 
cities--usually under public spaces. The most common type of privately 
owned underground garage is that located in basement space of an office 
or apartment building. 
A combination of both aboveground and underground parking is 
occasionally used. Because this usually require~ two sets of ramps on 
the main floor (depending on the method of ramping), combinf;l.tion schemes 
are not usually economical. Under emergency conditions, the belowground 
portion could serve as a blast shelter and the aboveground floors later 
could serve as a fallout shelter if shielding analysis shows that it meets 
the necessary requirements. 
Whenever the structure is adjacent to a sloping street, direct 
access is used for all floors. Thus, aboveground and belowground spac~ 
is utilized without the use of interior ramps since the structure may be 
entered at several levels. Costs can be kept low because, by the usual 
code definitions, the structure is open-air and no mechanical ventilatio~ 
is required. 
An integral structure includes provision for parking within a 
structure intended for other purposes. This is rapidly becoming popular 
in office, hotel, and apartment structures. There are positive advantages 
for this type of structure as a shelter. When the parking is envelope~ 
within another structure, the shelter area gains protection from the 
surrounding walls. There is also access to the utilities of the surround-
ing structure. 
1-3.4 Type of Management 
The type of management is r eflected both in the amount of space 
devoted to other uses and in the location of the structure. .These facto:rs 
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may, in turn, influence the us fulness of the structure in a Civil Defense 
program. 
If the garage is exclusively a commercial enterprise, privately 
owned and operated, it is unlikely to be placed in a location determined 
by the community planning organization. This does not mean it cannot 
be utilized for shelter purposes, but its location may not be the most 
desirable. Since commercial garages usually charge fees on an hourly, 
daily, weekly, or monthly basis 9 the main floor will have enclosed areas 
devoted to offices and customer facilities , Frequently, prime space on the 
main level is leased to another facility. 
A parking facility erected by the city may be either city-operated 
or leased, When ope a ted by the city it may or may not charge a fee, 
but it is almost always a self-parking facility . When operated privately, 
it may or may not be a self~parking facility, 
A private parking garage i.s that type usually used in connection 
with another building function and provided for the convenience of the 
tenants . Usually the client parks his own vehicle and parking fees are 
normally included as part of the rent for the office or dwelling unit. 
1-3.5 Interfloor Travel 
Vertical circulation within the structure may be either by ramps 
or elevators . If ramps are used, considerable space is taken by them on 
each leveL Though this limits parking spaces the ran1ps may be used for 
shelter since their lopes are low. The minimum size garage that can be 
designed with ramps is approximately 110 by 160 feet. In this design, 
however, over two-thirds of the area is taken-by ramps--a very uneconom-
ical ratio of circulation space to storage. As the structure increases in 
size, the ramping ystem become more economical , and the garage 
becomes a better shelter, 
A garage using an elevator for vertical circulation requires 
only about 25 percent of the rea to be devoted to elevating devices . 
The structure can be placed on lot as narrow as 24 feet if there is access 
on two sides . The relative openness and typical narrowness of a building 
using elevator parking usually eliminates it as a shelter. 
The ramping systems that may be adopted in a garage are 
numerou , and the selection should be based primarily on the proportions 
and space available. Ease of construction9 area required, number and 
sharpness of turns, length of path of travel, separation of traffic, and 
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numerous other advantages or disdavantages of the various methods has 
little influence on the protection afforded by the strJ.ctureo The openings 
into the ramping system are the only critical considerationso 
The parking capacity of a structure varies with the facility 
associated with the garageo However9 even small garages have a large 
shelter capacity if they incorporate protective constructiono 
Ramped structures usually do not exceed five stories above grade 
for commercial instaHations 9 since additional height requires critical 
travel time regarded as an inconvenience to the customero The approxi-
mate limit is e ight storieso With respect to radiation protection, the 
taller structures are preferable since they offer greater overhead mass 
shieldingo 
1-30 7 Auxiliary Facilities 
Private garages have few 9 if any9 facilities such as rest rooms 
and lounges within the parking areaso Commercial garages usually 
include facilities for the convenience of customers9 but these are limited 
to the ground flooro About half of the garages now being built include 
some rentable space on the street level 9 with the remainder of this 
level accommodating circulation, administration~ and temporary 
storage spaceo The ground level of integral structures is usually used 
for lobbies or terraceso The other floor levels are typically open 
space 9 uninterrupted except by vertical circulation elementso There-
fore~ the space available for shelter will usually be open. Auxiliary 
features located on the main floor will not be useful because they will not 
have a high degree of protectiono 
1-308 Structure 
Although9 for flexib:Uity 9 long spans are recommended for 
parking garages 9 the majority of the commercial garages built use a 
structural grid varying from 20 to 30 feet squareo This bay size is 
based on an economical structural span modified by the stalllayout9 
angle of parking 9 and circulation system using current car dimensions. 
Reinforced concrete is most often used for the structural system9 but 
precast shapes are gaining in popularityo Exposed structural steel is 
generally limited in application to open~air elevator structures where 
local codes permit its useo :n:n parking garages located beneath other 
buildings 9 the structural bay is frequently a projection of the bay size 
selected for the superstructureo 
The reinforced concrete structure is preferable for radiat 'on 
shielding because of its mass. However, spans should be limited because 
of their structural behavior under blast loadings. Precast sections will 
require additional expense to achieve continuity over joints. 
CHAPTER II 
DESIGN STANDARDS OF THE GARAGE STRUCTURE 
2-1 General 
The successful design for a parking garage i~corporating protec-
tive features involves several design cr!teria. For parking, the design 
must facilitate the approac;h, the maneuvering, the parking, and the storing 
of vehicles, as well as include the special facilities required for the 
employees and the customers. This must be done in a manner which does 
not endanger the health or the safety of the p\lblic, as outlined by the build-
ing codes. In addition new criteria needed for :resistance to nuclear effects 
must be included in the design. 
This chapter briefly summar izes these de s ign requir ements, and 
co!Ifments on those requirements which have effect on the usefulness o~ 
the ~tructu;re as a shelter. 
2-2 Garage Criteria 
2-2.1 Main Floor Requirements 
The main floor of any parking garage, whether jt is a commercial 
o;r private facility, is devoted at least partially to the requir~ments of 
receiving and dispatching the ve:Picles, since the e~tra,nces and exits of 
the structure penetrate at this level. 
The entrances are laid out on principles $imilar to those applied 
to intersection design; that is, they are designed so that the cars may 
enter and leave t:Q.e garage either at a right ~ngle to the street traffic or 
be able to merge with the traffic. The entrances are de~ig;ned for relatively 
low ~peed operation, admitting cars easily without any danger of collision 
and with clear sight lines for both traffic and pedestrians. Entrances 
should be located as far as possible from street intersections. Do1,1ble or 
even triple lanes are prefer:ved, with each lane at least 12 feet wide. 
These wide lanes ideally suit the garage entrances to the mass 
movement of people. As discussed later, a merging type of exit may pro-
vide better blast protection. It should also be noted that the requirement 
for clear sight lines will automatically eliminate certain areas as fallout 
shelters. 
Immediately after entering the garage, a large reservoir area 
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should be located to absorb peak :'in =,bound :tr&lJfic, and to provide a place for 
tempor81ry storageo The extent of this area.. depends upon the type of 
garage plannedo Iff it is to be · ~at seU~parkiing faciHty 9 the cars wHl move 
through the area r~pidly and only a sman space is needed for distribution 
of ticketso lin a commerciaJ garage with ~ttendfint parking 9 the size of the 
reservoir9 which in xno::;t cases w:liH exceed space for ten cetrs~ is dependent 
upon the calculb!.ted :rate o . car a.r:rlval during the pesl\: parkll _g perlod9 
the a.verage time required for p&..l'kllng 9 and the number of parking atten-
dantso The :r"ese:r."V-oir ~red. -should conveniently form a transition between 
the entramtce and ramp:so Jlf the driver is to leave his car there 9 the area 
should be designed fo:r pedestrians to clrculate safely and it should be 
convenient to the custo:mer facH.itieso 
If the gars:~ge i s a commercia" type~ facilities which require 
public contact are located on the main floo:r adjacent to the reservoir area. 
Because of the commercial v~due of these spa.ces~ they are kept to a mini-
mumo The cashiers boo1:;h9 fore" example~ shou:1d be only large enough to 
issue tickets and conect fees e Bookkeeping &nd personnel administration 
should be housed in less valuable spaceo P ublic telephones, restrooms 
···- and check :rooms~ and essential customer facHities 9 s w 11 as some 
optional facilities such as man-- gervs office 9 service and repair9 and sales 
are also located on the main floor 6 
Thlls r eservoir space could be a useful b~rea for processing the 
entering shel er occupantso Placing these facJiJiUes on the gr ound floor . 
should be r econsidered if the structure is t s rve as a fallout sheltero 
Ramping down one level before entering this area could bring it within 
the shelter areao This would reduce the number of car stalls but would 
increase the rentable ground-floor spaceo 
From the reserv-oir area3 the flow of traffic leads directly. to the 
rampso The rb1mp location il.s primarily determined by the layout of the 
storage floorso ]j;. should be designed so that the terminal points on the 
storage floors will permit an efficient p· rking and travel arrangemento On 
the :main floor9 development of mr~.ximum :reservoir space would ideally 
place the ramps farthest froJtn. the entranceo For both efficiency and ease 
of travel, ramps shou~d h51ve grades between 10 and 15 percent. A 20 per-
cent grade is permissible for short ramps such as those use between 
staggered floorso AH :r~mps 8hould be eased to six percent grade at both 
the head and footo Width of r~mps should be 10 feet per lane and dividing 
strips be'~ween lanes shouJ.d be 18 inch So 
P reference should be g:lven to separ te ramps for the two direc-
tions of travel rblther 'than combining the twoo During the critical t ime of 
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entering the shelter, a single lane would be sufficient to handle the mass; 
movement. Then, if it is decided to evacuate automobiles, confusion and 
even panic may be avoided by having separate and distinct lanes for th,e 
outgoing cars and the incoming shelterees. 
2- 2.2 Storage Floors 
The principles of layout of a storage floor are evolved from the 
basic units of design ~ the car stall and the access aisle. The ideal layout 
of a floor is a maximum number of spaces with a minimum interference 
and restriction to car movemento 
With the constant change in automobile sizes, the stall size also 
changes. Currently an 18- foot length will accommodate 95 percent of all 
cars. A car width of 6 1/2 feet, plus 1 foot of clearance on both sides is 
the minimum stall widtho An 8- foot stall is used for attendant parking and 
8 1/~ feet for self- par king. 
Parking angles vary from :)o? ~o 90°. A 90° angle is generally 
the most economical for a number of reasons. It is easier to coordinate 
the layout with the structural grid, the access aisles can be used for two-
way movement, and dead-end aisles can be employed. ,Aisle widths are 
dependent upon the direction and angle of parking anQ. the turning ractius of 
the vehicles. 
The total area per auto depends upon the stall widtll used, the 
angle of parking, and whether head-in or back-in parking is used. For 
example, an 8 1/2 foot, 30° head-in stall requires 363 squ~re feet of stall 
and aisle as compared to 240 square feet for an 8-foot 90° back-in stall. 
Fer preliminary design purposes, 300 square feet per car is generally 
used, These figures do not include main circulation aisles. 
2- 3 Building Codes 
2-..3.1 Scope 
Building codes are prime instruments in the evolution of a build-
ing type. Codes are a control and safeguard for the public where hazard-
ous conditions could exist. The rather strict set of rules evolved for 
parking garages has become the criteria for design rather than merely 
an acceptable minimum. Some items required by codes will limit the 
construction to such a degree that the structure cannot effectively be used 
as a shelter unless protective mea$ures of a temporary nature are planned. 
Almost all the large cities where parking garages are being built 
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have published building codes. Stipulations se forth by them have been 
summarized from a survey of the foll wing three basic codes ~ 
. 2- 3.2 
The National Building Code 
The Basic Building Code of Building Officia s 
Conference of America 
The Uniform Building Code 
Definitions 
A parking garage i generally defined a a building or structure 
or a portion of , building in which motor vehicles containing a flammable 
fluid in its fuel storage tank are stored. It may be an enclosed or an open-
air structure. An enclosed parking garage means a garage having exterior 
closure walls and an open-air parking garage is defined by almost all 
codes as one havi:D..g not less than 50 percent of two sides of the garage 
open to the air at each story. If an enclosed parking garage is located in 
a story with one-half or more of its clear height below grade, it is defined 
as a basement parking garage. 
A parking garage does not include any areas for motor vehicle 
service or repair~ and the parking of bu ses, trucks, or similar vehicles 
is not permittede 
2- 3.3 Adjoining Uses 
Unless the exterior walls are of fire-resistant construction and 
are without openings , a p~rking garage must no be located adjacent to 
property lines. If the tructure is an open-air type, any wall with openings 
must be at least 15 fee from any line where another s -ructure might be 
built. Open-air garages cannot be located within or attached to a building 
used for ny other purposes unless separated from the other use by fire-
r esistant construction. 
2- 3.4 Area and Heigh 
Requiremen s r es ric 'ing height and rea vary considerably 
among the codeso · The codel are consisten · in permi ting unlimited 
height and area when fireproof construe ion is used. In open-air non-com-
bustible construction, height imitations vary from five to eight stories 
and area limita ions from 12,000 '·o 30,000 l quare feete Increases in 
both heigh and area are permi ted by some codes if open-air construction 
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is used on the third and fourth sides of the structure, or if a sprinkler 
system is added to the garage. 
2-3.5 Other Occupancies in . the Structure 
All codes prohibit any other occupancy within or attached to an 
enclosed parking garage unless separated by barriers of non-combustible 
material and unpierced by openings except doors equipped with self-
closing devices. Small areas, such as offices and salesrooms, are 
permitted if they are constructed of a material that resists the passage of 
smoke, gas, and odor. 
2-3.6 Structure and Materials 
Live loads in most codes are established at 100 pounds per square 
foot and no reduction of live loads is permitted. 
The construction of enclosed garages must be of non-combustible 
materials and open-air garages must be of fire-resistive construction. 
Codes further require that the floor surfaces shall be of non-combustible 
material without pits or depressions, and graded to drains. Non-absorbent, 
non-combustible materials such as concrete are required for :Ooor finishes . 
Parking on roofs is limited to structures of fireproof construction. Roof 
parking further requires parapets and wheel guards. Adequate curb and 
guard rails must be provided at openings in exterior walls of open-air 
parking garages. 
When basements of public garages are used for purposes other 
than parking, access shall be from the outside only, and the first-floor 
construction must be fire resistant and both water and vapor proof~ 
2-3.7 Exits 
Only on exit way is required for each story of a structure of 
fireproof construction. If the tructure is of fire-resistive construction 
and parks more than sixty vehicles per story, or of less than fire-resis-
tive construction and parks more than forty-five vehicles per story, two 
separate exit ways are required. If mechanical parking is used in an 
open-air structure, only one exit way is usually required for each floor. 
Ramps which are not considered as required exits need not be enclosed in 
fire-resistive, non-combustible, or sprinklered garages. 
2-3 .8 Openings 
Where the exterior enclosing walls are omitted in an open -air 
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structure 9 it is not permitted to close the opening, partially or completely, 
with glass or tarpaulins. Openings from garages into spaces for other 
occupancies must be equipped with self~closing fire doors. 
Lifts 
In an enclosed structure, all vertical shafts for elevators or vents 
must be enclosed. In open parking garages, lifts used only to transport 
employees need not be enclosed except with a protective wire mesh. 
2-3.10 Heating and Ventilation 
In enclosed buildings used for parking automobiles operated 
under thei r own power, exhaust ventilation must be provided to produce 
one complete change of air every 15 minutes. Such exhaust ventilation 
shall be taken from a point at or near the floor level. 
When garages are located below grade, they must be ventilated 
by a mechanical system with positive means for both intake and exhaust. 
Requirements for air changes can be as high as eight per hour. Mechani-
cal ventilation may be omitted in small parking areas (5000 square feet or 
approximately 12 cars) if the space has unobstructed openings to outer air 
sufficient to provide necessary ventilation. 
In those areas of the structure not used for storing automobiles, 
such as the offices and waiting rooms, light and ventilation must be pro-
vided e ither naturally or artificially. At least two changes of air per hour 
must be pr ovided. Four ai r changes per hour are required for toilet rooms. 
If the structure is enclosed and heated, all heating plants, except 
direct-fired heaters 9 must be located in separate buildings or must be 
enclosed within the structure with solid, watertight and vaportight masonry. 
Entrance to these spaces must be from the outside, since no openings , are 
permitted through the fire division. 
2-3.11 Fire Protection Equipment 
Sprinkler systems are required for enclosed garages over 65 
feet high which exceed 10 9 000 square feet per floor if of fire-resistive 
construction or 89 000 square feet per floor if of protected non-combustible 
constructiono Open~air garages over 65 feet in height and exceeding 
15 9 000 square feet per floor also r equire a sprinkler system. 
If the building i s less than 7 5 feet high9 a one-source system may 
be used in buildings of which the upper stories are designed for other 
uses when the garage has a capacity of more than twenty automobiles. If 
a building is more than 75 fee t high~ a two~, $ource system is required. 
In addition to automatic fire-extinguishing systems, a portable 
fire extinguisher must be installed at each stair and lift opening on each 
parking level. 
2 .... 3.12 Toilets 
If both sexes are employed in the garage, there should be two 
toilet rooms located within the s tructure. The number of fixtures depends 
upon the number employed. Toilet facilities for the convenience of the 
customers are not required. 
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CHAPTER III 
NUCLEAR EFFECTS RESISTANCE AND SHELTER REQUIREMENTS 
3-1 General 
The previous sections discussed the design criteria for a park-
ing garage intended for use under normal conditions. To these must be 
added the specific design criteria for resistance to nuclear effects and 
the requirements of habitability if the structure is to serve as a shelter. 
Knowledge of the details that increase the ability of the structure to 
withstand nuclear effects and to protect occupants can be used to take 
advantage of all the protec ion av~ula le. 
3- 2 Design Considerations 
In the design phase of the building, the designer should decide 
how the structure can best be used as a shelter during an emergency 
period and then orient his improven1ents towards that use. The building 
could serve in three different capacities during an emergency period~ 
1) Designed to ~ct as a shelter during the blast and thermal 
waves and also during the subsequent period of fallout, in which case all 
phases of nuclear effects must be considered. 
2) Designed to remain standing through the blast and thermal 
waves and only after this be utilized for shelter purposeso 
3) Designed to serve as a fallout shelter on the assumption that 
the intensities of both the blast and thermal waves are negligible. 
The attention given to various nuclear effects depends on which 
type of protection the building is intended to offer. Equal resistance to 
all nuclear effects cannot easily be established, since the intensities 
of all nuclear phenomena vary independently. Certain assumptions must 
be made for each hazard and they can best be examined individually. 
3-3 Thermal Intensities and Fire Hazards 
Approximately one-third of the energy released from a nuclear 
detonation is in the form of thermal energy9 which travels outward in a 
straight line in all directions. Traveling at the speed of light, it is the 
first effect to reach the area surrounding the target. The amount of 
energy received, the time period over which it is applied, the ignition 
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~ptn*· ~fla ather properU.ea of the mate:rti, ,receiving the energy will 
qeterlllin.e the probability that fires ma. ~sultg The thermal inten-
~lties received as a direct result of the ~rmal pulse are usually 
npt sufficient to cause ignitj.on of fire-:ra ~ 13tant structures. The 
on~ef qa,nger results from tne ignition of :, ~ore flammable materials 
Jn the neighborhood or in thf;} :interiior o~ e s tructure. 
Indirectly 8 fire hazards also e~~ ~ as a result of blast effects. A 
nre may be caused within a, s tructur e th :is otherwise isolated from 
le;n~t~ble material af3 a result of elect:r.io J short ci.rcuits or gas lines 
da.maged by the blast wave, 
It shoul<l be pointed out that tner al intensities which might not 
o~~se severe damage to a s tructure coql 1:>e extremely dangerous to 
pool-l:pants9 'rherefo;re, if the structure i1 ~ntended as a shelter, special 
attf;lntio:q. should be given to the shieldiue; ,f the occupants from the thermal pulse. 
r:J.1ll~~ ~P,i~l~ need not b~ massive, as any aterial which casts a shadow 
\Y~P qffer proteotiPn. 
,c\uto+nobUe~ sbqulcl also be shit3~ ed as they could possibly ignite. 
Q~e Pf the main h~za.:rq~ l~ the fabric wpn Jstery. At the tests in Nevada, 
~tla:rmal rac:Uation ignit~d the uphols tery ~ d caused fi r e to spread in 
p~Qsed auto:wobiles~ ln a s imulated pa:r ipg lot~ much of the damage to 
,lJot.se, p~int, and lnteriora was due to fir caused by thermal radiation. 
pQ.soUp.e tanka of the pa.r}<ed vehicles al'e pot particularly vulnerable to 
pirept ignition from the tp.er:mal pulse, si pe they are shielded from ex-
fQ~v,:re by the autqmobile bodies. 
To design a structure less vulnf;l ;J.'" ble to thermal and fire hazards, 
flt~se qesi~n :principles should be useq ~ 
Pl~n;p,i;q~ and :m.a,t~:rial selection ril:J,ould be based on good fire 
prevention (3ta.ndarqs. 
The occupants and vehicles sh.04.l be shielded from exposure 
to th~ the:rm~l Pllls~~ 
Materials that will not sustain CQJllbustion should be used on 
expo~ed ~'-trfa.cea of the exterlor, 
Exposed flamma·t>le mater ials shQuld be shielded. 
Where possible, the s tructure sh l!ld be isolated from other 
elements t:ttat haye low ignitJ.on :p ~nts . 
3-4 Blast Effects 
The rapid expansion of air, caused by the high temperatures of 
the detonation9 causes a blast front to move outward at approximately the 
speed of sound. This front will pass through the area surrounding the 
target shortly after the thermal pulse. The difference between the high 
pressure behind the shock front and the ambient pressure is referred to 
as overpressure. It may cause much structural damage. When this over-
pressure strikes a surface, it results in a reflected overpressure, ampli-
fing the overpressure to a degree varying with the angle of incidence 
between the shock front and the surface. 
When the blast wave encounters a building, there is at first a 
pressure on the front face , which is increased by the reflected overpres-
sure. This is followed by a gradual unloading of the front face as the 
blast wave progresses past the face and sequentially loads the roof and 
sides, then the back face. The overpressure acts equally in all directions9 
tending to compress any structure engulfed by the blast wave. This over-
pressure is accompanied by a dynamic pressure or wind, which acts in the 
direction of movement of the blast front and tends to drag any engulfed 
object. 
Because the location of a structure relative to the detonation is 
unknown, the exact loading cannot be predicted. Accordingly, design loa.ds 
for blast analysis are usually established from an assumed value of peak 
overpressure. 
The effects of blast loadings on a garage depend upon numerous 
conditions, but most important is the position of the structure relative to 
the ground surface. 
In an aboveground, enclosed structure, the reflected overpressure 
on the front wall tends to move the entire structure because momentarily 
there is no equalizing pressure on the rear wall. Large buildings are 
more subject to this translational loading because of the time required to 
engulf the building. Any aboveground structure will be subjected to the 
dynamic pressures or wind, which generally apply translational loads 
for a longer period than the overpressure does. 
In an open type of aboveground structure, however, the loadings 
caused by the overpressures, reflected overpressures, and drag forces 
may be substantially reduced. The reduction depends primarily on the 
percentage of area of the walls that are open and permit the blast wave to 
pass through the structure. 
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In an under ground structure , the blast-induced forces result 
from the pressure exerted by the surface overpressure wave being 
propagated through the soil. Since no overturning or dynamic pressure 
forces are exerted the potential blast resistance i s much higher. 
In addition, plan configuration and building orientation have an 
influence on the amount of blast energy imparted to the structureo 
As in the case of thermal radiation, increasing the structural 
resistance does not necessarily provide blast protection to the occupants. 
Structural resistance can be developed to resist 5 psi overpressure at 
moderate expenseo Overpressures below this are not generally fatal, but 
secondary effects of the blast are still quite hazardous at these pressure 
levelso At less than 1 psi, the shattering of glass and flying debris can 
present problems that must be considered if the structure is intended to 
protect occupants immediately after a detonation. Also, the dynamic 
winds following the blast wave can blow people about, causing injuries, 
Automobiles and busses were exposed to several of the 
nuclear test explosions in Nevadao In most cases, it was not primarily 
overpressure, but drag forces which produced damage to the vehicles. 
At a peak over pressure of 5 psi, motor vehicles were badly battered, 
their tops and sides pushed in, windows broken, and hoods blown 
open. However, the engines were still operable and the vehicles 
could be driven away after the explosiono 
In shelter design, these principles will help incr ease the protec-
tion from blast effects~ 
Protect occupants from flying debris and shattering glass. 
Protect occupants from hazardous pressures. 
Select material that will insure ductile r esponseo 
Design to achieve maximum continuity in the structural frame. 
Avoid unnecessary fragile materials, projections, and 
fixtures. 
3-5 Nuclear Radiation 
The ener gy given off in the form of nuclear radiation may be 
either initial or residuaL Initial radiation has a limited range, but 
within an area of a few thousand feet from the burst point can have 
intensities which can be lethal. Residual radiation in the form of 
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fallout can cover larger areas with lethal effects than the blast or 
thermal phenomena will. Hazardous levels of fallout can be expected 
in the downwind direction at distances up to several hundred miles 
from large yield surface or belowground bursts - considerably 
beyond the range of hazardous thermal radiation or bla:E?t levels. 
Upwind, or in the case of an air burst, the hazards of residual 
radiation will be less critical than those of thermal radiation and 
blast, Since fallout patterns are variable, the exact intensities 
cannot be predicted. The general practice is to assume a degree of 
protection and to design the structure to that standard. 
None of the nuclear radiation emitted has any notable effect on 
building materials or motor vehicles. Radiation does not alter the 
structural properties or the appearance of the material exposed and the 
mate:rials that attenuate radiation do not in turn become radioactive. 
However9 most types of nuclear radiation are harmful to human beings. 
If the parking garage is to serve as a fallout shelter, protection 
against radiation should be incorporated into the design. Protection may 
be accomplished by placing a shield between the source and those to be 
sheltered, or by reducing the intensity of the contributing source. Pro-
tection utilizing shielding may be accomplished either by the use of 
geometry, a barrier, or a combination of both. A complete description 
of the method of analysis of the two types of shielding is given in the 
Professional Manual 100.1 "Design and Review of Structures for Protec-
tion From Fallout Gamma Radiation". 
Geometry shielding is protection offered due to distance from the 
source. Generally, the radiation intensity decreases as the distance 
increases. To takeadvantage of geometry shielding, the designer should 
select a shelterlocation as far as possible from the source of contamina-
tion. The center of a structure is farthest from the ground contribution 
and the lowest level is farthest from overhead contributions. In multi-
level structures, the intermediate floors offer better shelter areas than 
the lower and upper floors. While located several levels below the 
overhead contribution, they are also still several levels above the 
neighboring ground contribution. 
Barrier shielding is achieved by the application of the principle 
that rays are absorbed or attenuated in the course of their passage 
through any material. A decrease in radiation intensity depends on the 
mass of the material between the source and the point of observation. 
To accomplish the same degree of attenuation, a substance of low density 
req,uires a greater thickness than one of a high density. Therefore, the 
designer should select massive materials in pr eference to lighter weight 
ones, where economically feasible, and the massive materials should 
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enclose the shelter area. 
Without altering the construction, the amount of radiation received 
in a protected area can be substantially reduced by partial removal of the 
fallout material from the area surrounding the shelter. Natural removal 
of the fallout material by wind or rain can be encouraged by using details 
and planning devices which will make decontamination of the area easier. 
However, they should not be expected to be completely effective. To make 
decontamination easier, use smooth finished materials on both vertical and 
horizontal surfaces. Equally important is avoiding designs that can trap 
fallout in critical areas. Decontamination by hosing or sprinkling requires 
large quantities of water that may be in critical supply and eventually 
- requires a system to remove the collected particles from the immediate 
area. Vacuuming is more effective, but still requires disposal of the 
debris. 
3-6 Habitability 
If the shelter is designed for protection against radioactivity, 
the period of occupancy may extend to many days or even weeks. A 
structure not originally constructed for habitation, and yet one expected 
to house many people in an emergency, must be planned so that modifica-
tions can be made hastily to permit community life to continue under 
emergency conditions. 
The prime purpose of a shelter is to keep the occupants in good 
mental and physical health. Consideration must be given to the problems 
of food and water supply, sanitation, ventilation, heating and cooling, 
lighting, administration, communication, fire safety, and space 
arrangement. 
The treatment of injuries resulting from a .nuclear detonation, as 
well as the usual sicknesses, births, and deaths, will have to be handled. 
For these purposes 9 a clinic should be considered as part of a complete 
shelter. The clinic would also function as the control center to maintain 
the health of the occupants. 
Both food and water must have controlled distribution, but only 
the minimum daily requirements should be planned for. Food will 
undoubtedly be stored at a central point, and the distribution from this 
point would be directly to the occupants. If any additional food is availa-
ble, it probably will require special preparation and eating areas. The 
emergency supplies do not require special facilities. The water supply 
will also be in a central location, whether it is from a supply that has been 
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built into the buildill_g (such as the firefighting reservoir) or from con-
tainers stored for emer gency use. It should be made available throughout 
the shelter,- not only for drinking but also for personal cleanliness, food 
preparation, cleaning utensils, removal of wastes, firefighting~ and other 
uses. 
Sanitation involves both personal hygiene of the occupants and 
keeping the shelter clean. Toilet facilities should provide privacy and 
separation of the sexes, and should be convenient to all areas of the 
shelter . Areas must be established for commodes and washing facilities. 
The design and selection of m terials should consider ease of cleaning 
and the control of pests. 
Special attention must be given to the heating or cooling of a 
structure not ordinarily used for sheltering large numbers of people. 
Control of humidity, oxygen 9 carbon dioxide, and odors will have to be 
studied for the physiological and psychological effect they might have on 
a confined group. 
Closely related to ventilation are space and volume require-
ments. Either requirement could limit the shelter capacity. Under some 
situations, the large volume of air in the structure will be adequate 
for the occupants during emergency conditions without mechanically 
supplied fresh air. The space available should be studied so that the most 
efficient arrangement can be made and the maximum number of occupants 
accommodated. The large flexible space of the garage should be capable 
of being subdivided into areas providing sleeping, eating, and recreation 
areas for the occupants and special areas for toilets , administration, 
clinic and storage. 
The lighting should also be studied. Minimum levels used in the 
garage will probably be acceptable in most areas, but special or auxiliary 
lighting may be required in the clinic, administration, and food prepara-
tion areas. 
Parking garages are required by codes to meet standards for 
fire safety, but car e should be taken to avoid the hazards that may arise if 
the building is used as a shelter. The disposal of trash and paper should be 
~tudied. Open-flame devices should be avoided. Under emergency condi-
tions, even a small fire becomes a hazard, since it would consume valuable 
oxygen and the smoke pr oduced could cause panico 
CHAPTER IV 
INCORPORA TJION OF PROTECTIVE FEATURES 
4-1 General 
In the following chapter, planning principles and construction 
details are analyzed with respect to protection from various nuclear effects. 
4-2 Site Considerations 
4-2.1 Scope 
The selection of a site will continue to be based primarily on 
economic principles for the parking garage, relative to the traffic pattern, 
parking demand, and land cost However 9 if the parking garage is to serve 
as a shelter also, the desirability of the site as a location for a shelter 
should be considered. If the site has already been selected, or if the struc-
ture has already been built, certain features of the site, such as terrain pr 
neighboring structures, should be considered to determine the type of prb'~ 
tection which can be incorporated and how this protection can best be used. 
-;l-2.2 Soil Conditions 
The condition of the soil is an important factor for both above-
ground and belowground structureso The characteristics and bearing 
capacities should be considered under both normal and blast loading. In 
general, it can be said that the soil types that behave best under conven .... 
tiona! loading will also behave best under blast or dynamic loading. Under 
dynamic loading, the structure and the soil act together, which assists in 
resisting soil failure at pressures greater than those which would cause 
failure under static loads . Bearing pr essures under dynamic-loading are 
discussed in Professional Manual 100~5, "Design and Review: of Structures 
for Integrated Protection from Nuclear Weapons." In general it can be 
said if detailed soil information is not available , the dynamic bearing 
pressure may be taken as twice the conventional allowable static value. 
4-2.3 Surface and Topography 
The terrain of the site and the surrounding area has some 
influence on the blast energy received on the structure. Variations in 
incident overpressur e are produced by the character of the surface and the 
topography. A significant downward slope in the di rection of the path of 
the blast fr ont causes a decrease in peak overpressure, while an upward 
slope produces an increase. As the incident level of peak overpressure 
increases, the change in peak overpressure caused by a given change in 
slope becomes a smaller proportion of incident overpressure. The 
presence of many buildings as in a city complex will cause local changes 
in the blast wave, especially in the dynamic pressure. Some shielding 
could result from intervening buildings, however multiple reflections 
between buildings and the channeling caused by streets may tend to 
increase overpressures and dynamic pressures. The resulting effect on 
damage is difficult to predict. 
Fallout quantities will be affected by the terrain surface features. 
Even light winds will tend to sweep smooth surfaces and pile up fallout 
particles against curbs, buildings or other obstructions. Earth used in 
grading or landscaping on the surface of an underground structure will 
act as a barrier shield against radiation from fallout. 
4-2.4 Neighboring Structure 
Nearby structures could provide some degree of shielding from 
all nuclear effects. Non-combustible structures may be regarded as a 
thermal shield. If they are located between the detonation and the shel-
ter, the shelter will not be exposed to thermal radiation. However, if 
they are flammable, nearby buildings could present a fire hazard. 
Careful selection of building locations could be an effective means of 
reducing area fires. The distance between buildings should be at least 
50 feet if the probability of fire spread is to be limited to 50 percent. 
In order to eliminate the spread of fire almost completely, the distance 
between buildings should be over 300 feet. 
The modification of the pressure wave by an obstacle or struc-
ture between a shelter and the explosion is particularly noticeable in the 
reflected overpressures and the drag loadings. If the obstacle and the 
shelter are closely spaced, the shock wave is disturbed, and the drag 
coefficients are modified. If the shock front has been substantially 
disturbed, reflected pressure effects on the shelter may almost disappear. 
If the distance between elements in the direction the shock wave is travel-
ing is equal to or greater than approximately 10 times the lateral" dimen-
sion of the windward element, the effects of shielding become very small 
and can be neglected. In open-air structures, the effects of shielding can 
usually be neglected even though the distance may be much less than ten 
times the lateral dimension mentioned. 
In areas where there is a high percentage of ground coverage by 
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buildings, the place of fallout contamination is elevated and varied. This 
produces a variation in the contribution to the upper levels of shelter 
areas. 
4-2.5 Utilities 
In order to eliminate danger from falling utility poles and to 
~nsure continued service, · nder ground utn·ties are preferable. Damage 
to underground -services beyond the ground shock area is not probable. 
Where the utilities pass through exterior walls, provision must be made 
for relative motion between the structure and the adjacent earth in order 
to avoid rupture of the pipe or conduit. The possibility of loss of pressure 
through breakage of pipes at this point or even within the structure is 
more serious than failure of underground pipes. Damage to the water 
supply is critical for firefightL_g and th problem can be partially remedied 
by the use of flexible connections at the building. The water supply and 
sewage lines should be designed so that contaminated material cannot enter 
the protected installation through the piping. The emergency supplies 
stored in the shelter do not require the continued operation of these utili-
ties and they can be shut off. 
4-2.6 Landscaping 
Landscaping elements in the vicinity of the shelter structure or 
above or belowground structure should be studied for the hazards that 
they may present. Trees, grass, and shrubs are all subject to sustained 
burning and should not be located near entrances or air intakes. Decon-
tamination of a lawn area is almost impossible unless the earth is turned 
over. It is preferable to use p~ved areas that can be easily decontaminated. 
Pool surfaces are self-decontaminating since the fallout material will 
settle and the water then provides a barrier shield. However, a pool used 
on the roof of an underground structure will lose the mass shielding of the 
water as the fallout material settles. 
4-2.7 Orientation 
If the probable direction of the blast can be assumed, it should 
be considered in the structural plan. The general orientation of the 
garage should be used to resist the bla t forces, since the elevation facing 
the detonation is subjected to the highest pressur eso The difference in 
forces is not very pronounced in conventional rectangular structures, 
but a long, narrow structure is more resistant to blast against the end 
rather than on the side. 
4-3 Space Requirements 
4-3.1 Scope 
In a garage structure, the shelter space, unlike a school or 
apartment building structure, is very open and the assignment of certain 
spaces for various shelter functions is not readily apparento In a school, 
for example 9 the shelter administration area can logically be assigned 
to the suite of school offices and the clinic can be located in the 
health suite. 
Space requirements and space arrangements should be studied 
beforehand. This can best be done by the architect when he is making the 
preliminary layout of the building, and it is recommended that the architect 
prepare a schematic emergency-use floor plan which would be available in 
the garage office to assist the shelter manager. The shelter then could be 
quickly organized to run efficiently according to the plan best suited for 
that particular shelter. 
4-3.2 Capacity 
In order to determine the necessary space for each emergency 
function, the approximate shelter capacity must be determined. As a 
general rule, those floors of the structure that will be used as a fallout 
shelter would have an occupancy of approximately 30 times the total car 
capacity. This assumes that the area per vehicle is 300 square feet and 
that 10 square feet is adequate for each shelter occupant. Both these 
figures should be refined by studying the various arrangements of 
parking and shelter facilities within the structure. The final figure is 
modified by the disposition of the automobiles during an emergency. 
Recreation and Eating 
During the period of shelter occupancy, the shelterees will be 
awake most of the time. A great deal of active recreation would not 
ordinarily be encouraged since it demands more space, food, and 
oxygen. Passive recreation is mor.e desirable, and variety can be 
accomplished by defining numerous small group areas. Listening to 
music and watching films i s an excellent diversion for both children 
and adults. Assuming the proper equipment has been supplied and 
that power is available, an isolated space should be assigned to these 
activities if possible, since the noise may be disturbing to some. 
Adults should have space for reading, discussions, and table games. 
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In most cases, no special area will have to be assigned for 
eating space. The emergency food rations recommended to be provided 
for adults are high-calorie biscuits. These need no preparation and only 
a distribution point is required. If it is anticipated that other food sources 
will be available - for example, an integral-type of garage shelter in a 
hotel could have access to the food of the hotel kitchen - then, preparation 
and distribution space, special eating areas, and dishwashing facilities 
must be provided. In all cases an area should be provided for preparation 
of infants food or other special diets where some cooking is required. 
However, special areas are the exception, and efforts will be limited to 
locating the emergency food and water distribution points. They should be 
both convenient to the shelterees and easy for the shelter management to 
control. 
Under emergency conditions, seven square feet per occupant is 
an accepta le minimum area for recreation and eating. Since this space 
would be used for two-thirds of the day, about -4. 7 square feet (2/3 x 7) 
should be allotted for each shelter occupant. 
Sleeping Areas 
The amount of area assigned o sleeping is the most variable 
since it depends upon the type of beds supplied in the shelter. Probably 
the most economical type of sleeping accommodations to supply and store 
is hammocks. These require fastening devices to be installed in the ceiling 
during construction. If the standard army cot is used, a large amount of 
floor spaqe is needed.. Including aisle space, an area about 4 by 8 feet is 
required for each bed. Assuming three shifts of sleeping, 10.7 square feet 
(32 x 1/3) are required for each shelter occupant. Special bunk beds could 
be designed and stocked in the shelter. If a unit 2 by 6 1/2 feet is used, 
requiring a floor area of 3 by 8 feet, double bunks require four square 
feet per shelter occupant (1/2 x 24 x 1/3). Triple bunks need be of special 
design because of the lower ceiling heights used in garages. These require 
2. 7 square feet per shelter occupant. 
The area assigned to sleeping should be isolated from any 
noisy activities. 
4-3.5 Toilets and Washing Facilities 
Permanent toilet installations are probably limited to the mini-
mum number required for the structure in its normal function. Addi-
tional water closets to accommodate all shelter occupants can not be 
installed without exorbitant expense. Emergency commodes included in 
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the supplies stocked within the shelter area provide the most economical 
solution. 
Privacy is still important, and advance layout and location should 
be studied s ince considerable space will be required. The number of 
commodes should be far less than those required by codes for dormitory 
use. 
The designer can assume a time-use per day and a total space 
assignment as a method of approximating the space required for toilet 
and washing facilities. For example, if 30 minutes pe day per person 
and 30 square feet per station including both commode and washing) are 
assumed, then 0.625 square feet (30/1440 x 30) is r equired for each shelter 
occupant . If the shelter housed 1000 occupants, an area of 625 square feet 
is required. 
Shower facilities hould not be considered because of the space 
and water required. Decontamination by a flushing stream of water can 
be accomplished with a hose; or more simply, contaminated clothes can 
be brushed or changed before entering the shelter area. 
4-3.6 Administration 
From experience with shelters established during natural 
disasters, it has been found that pr oper control and administration of a 
shelter is the key to a successfu period of occupancy. Without good 
shelter management, s ituations of near r iot can arise. A familiarity 
with these problems should assist the designer in making a layout that 
lends itself to more efficient management. 
Persons taking shelter lack any preparation, and few will be 
able to bring essential clothing or r equired bedding, food, water, or other 
supplies, since the garage tructure will shelte r people in the city on 
business or shopping. The people may be in a state of exhaustion or shock. 
One of the first duties of the shelter management is r egistration of the 
shelterees. If the entrance is pre-disaster, registration would probably 
be upon entering; however, in a post-disaster situation, medical aid, food, 
or clothing may have to be issued prior to registration. Throughout the 
entire emergency situation, the shelter manager is involved with accommo-
dating the structure to the shelterees. The space use of the building must 
be designated; the assignmen of duties to personnel for security patrol, 
distribution of supplies, and cleaning must be made; procedures must be 
established concerning communicat:ons, sanitation, entertainment, religious 
servlces, and many other items. 
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For the execution of these duties 9 an office should be establishe~ 
that has control over the shelter and yet can be physically isolated from 
it. Under emergency conditions~ it would not seerr1 unreasonable to provide 
working space of 60 square feet per worker, and. that one staff member may 
be required in the administration office for each 50 shelter occupantse This 
would require a space assignment of 0.4 square feet per shelter occupant 
(60/50 x 1/3). These figures are only approximate and the architect-
engineer should consult with the shelter management team before actual 
space allocations are made. 
4-3.7 Health Center 
In a designated shelter~ medical supplies are furnished by 
Civil Defense authorities prior to the emergency and a proper storage 
point should be established. Closely related to this in the plan layout 
should be the locat~on of the proposed health center. 
If the occupants enter the shelter after a disaster, medical 
treatment will be an important function of the shelter. If the occupants 
enter prior to an emergency, a medical center will be required for the 
period of occupancy to assist the infirm and aged, as well as to control 
the spread of communicable diseases. Ward space will not require addi-
tional space as it can be taken from the dormitory and recreation space 
allowance. 
4-3.8 Storage 
A complete description of the materials recommended to be 
stored in a fallout shelter is described in OCD Manual 8520.1, "Descrip-
tion, Care and Handling of Supplies for Public Fallout Shelters". Briefly, 
the following kits are available and selected ones probably will be used 
in the shelter ~ 
Persons to 
Kit Volume be supplied 
Sanitation Kit Ill 3.36 cu. feet 25 
Sanitation Kit IV 3.36 cu. feet 50 
Radiation Kit 1.08 cu. feet One Per shelter 
Food 2q26 cu. feet 7 
Food 1. 52 cu. feet 5 
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Persons to 
Kit Volume be supplied 
Medical A 1.0 cu. feet 65 
Medical C 5.2 cu. feet 325 
Water 17. 5 gallons 5 
In a garage shelter, these supplies would take about 0.16 square 
feet per shelter occupant. Other supplies may be required, but are not as 
yet available in OCD prepackaged storage kits. Consideration should also 
be given to storage of beds, bedding, furniture, amusement articles, etc. 
4-3.9 Summary 
The total net area per shelter occupant, including space for 
recreation, eating, toilets, administration, medical, and storage, but 
excluding sleeping space, is about 6 1/2 square feet. The space require-
ments vary chiefly with the sleeping arrangement proposed. If cots are 
used for sleeping 17.2 square feet is required, if double bunks are used 
10.5 square feet, and if triple bunks are used, 9.2 square feet are required. 
If possible these areas should be further increased to 23, 14, and 12.5 
square feet to allow for circulation space. The net areas discussed in this 
section are not in complete agreement with the minimum requirements of 
the National Shelter Survey and the architect-engineer is cautioned to 
carefully evaluate the needs of the individual shelter. 
These figures only apply to free area not occupied by automobiles. 
The policy of evacuating automobiles from the shelter will vary with the 
structure and the particular situation. The occupancy rate of parking 
garages vary from nearly empty to, in some cases, over 100 percent. 
The average occupancy can be assumed to be 60 percent of the automobile 
capacity. 
4-4 Special Considerations of the Automobile 
4-4.1 
The planning of a combination parking garage-shelter structure 
should consider the possible presence of automobiles in an emergency. 
As pointed out previously, the automobile presents some indirect hazards 
to the shelterees from blast and thermal energies. There are other dis-
advantages and problems presented by the automobile. There are also 
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some features which may be regarded as assets and sometimes the design 
can take advantage of the presence of automobiles. 
i . 
-:,1:-4.2 ... , .. Space 
The two major limiting factors to the number of occupants 
which can be housed in a shelter are floor space and volume. Though 
the floor space and volume taken up by automobiles r emaining in the 
shelter is difficult to use, it i s not necessarily lost. The interior space 
and the volume above and including the vehicle is counted as part of the 
volume of the shelter. 
The amount of warning time would determine whether or not the 
automobiles could be evacuated before an attack. A pre-attack evacuation 
is desirable for the most efficient use of the shelter. If the situation 
permits, the garage should be closed well in advance of a possible 
emergency. No problem of car removal would arise, and a maximum 
amount of space would be available .. 
In the event that evacuation is not possible prior to an attack, 
the automobile may or may not be removed during the emergency period. 
It should be noted that even if the garage is filled to its maximum capacity 
of automobiles, as much as half of its floor area is open to use by _shel-
terees, and space is available in the interiors of the vehicles. Without 
. attempting .to remove the cars from the shelter, the space can be rearranged 
into more usable areas. The vehicles can be moved into areas of lower 
protecti?n factors where their mass would provide additional shielding, or 
they can be concentrated in a single area and assigned as sleeping facilities. 
If it is decided to remove the stored vehicles from the shelter 
after the attack, it will be difficult except in the case of the aboveground 
shelter. If the shelter is belowground, pushing many cars manually up a 
steep ramp would be very difficult. On the other hand, driving them out 
creates carbon monoxide, which might overtax the mechanical ventila-
tion system. 
In either case, the vehicles would have to be removed in the 
short period before fallout occurs or after the radiation intensi~y falls 
low enough to permit short periods of stay in unprotected areas. In 
high-density areas, there ould be ittle or no space for autos without 
blocking critical traffic routes. 
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4--4.3 Supplies 
Whether the automobiles remain or are removed from the 
shelter, certain items within them may be useful in an emergency. The 
presence of automobiles should not be relied on in planning for the 
efficient operation of the shelter since it is preferable to have the automo-
biles evacuated prior to occupancy. 
Water is the most useful commodity that must be supplied~ The 
water stored in the emergency supply kits will be needed for drinking, 
and may not be generally available for washing or cleaning. The water 
in automobiles, even though containing antifreeze and not potable, could 
undoubtedly be utilized for uses other than personal. 
If a gasoline-powered generator is part of the mechanical 
equipment, the gasoline from the tanks of the stored vehicles could serve 
as a reserve fuel supply if the automobiles are not removed from the 
shelter. Removing the gasoline from the tanks and handling would have 
to be carefully controlled because of the explosive and fire hazards 
involved,. 
Numerous other items should be considered as possible useful 
l!laterials in an emergency. Batteries could be removed and combined as 
an emergency power source. Car ;radios could be placed throughout the 
shelter to be used as a communication system. In sorpe cases, short wave 
transceivers found in some automobiles might be used for communicatiqns 
to Civil Defense headquarters. If the vehicles are to be taken from the 
structure, the seats should be removed to serve as seating in the shelter, 
Otber helpful items such as tools, flashlights, and blankets should be 
stored in the shelter before the automobiles are removed. 
4-5 Structure and Materials 
4-S.l Scope 
The selection of the structural system and the materials, 
which depend upon the function to be housed within a structure, the loca,-
tion of the structure (i.e., aboveground, belowground, or partially buried), 
the O.esired spans, the exterior walls (i.e., completely open, partially open, 
frangible or non-frangible) etc., is an important planning consideration in 
conventional building design. It becomes even more important fo:r a struc-
ture designed to resist low-level blast pressures and to provide racUation 
protection. 
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4-5.2 Type of Structure 
P arking garages situated abovegr ound are of two general types: 
enclosed or open-air, or possibly a combination of the two types. Although 
the open-air type is most common, the reaction or response to nuclear 
blast effects and the nuclear radiation protection capability of both types 
will be discussed. Appendix A, Weapons Effects , contains a general 
discussion of the propagation of blast waves and their interaction with 
structures. For a more detailed discussion, the reader is referred to 
"Effects of Nuclear Weapons", and ASCE Manual No. 42. 
a. A structure with wall openings , such as door s and windows, 
with an area of less than about 5 percent of the total exterior wall area, 
is considered to be an enclosed structure for pur poses of determining 
the blast loading on the structural system, including the exterior walls , 
roof, supporting frame, shear walls , foundations , etco It i s further assumed 
that the walls are sufficiently strong so as to remain intact under the blast 
loading. The pressures on the interior surfaces of the exterior envelope 
and the supporting frames are assumed to remain at atmospheric pressure 
before the arrival of the shock front of the blast wave. 
As the shock front strikes the structure, it is reflected, and the 
pressure in the wave is substantially increased. The resulting reflected 
pressure, which is the loading on the front face of the structure, is not 
only a function of the peak overpressure of the blast wave before reflec-
tion, but also of the shape of the structure {i.e., r ectangular, arched, etc.,) 
and of the angle of incidence between the shock front and the structureo 
For a rectangular structure with a wall directly fac ing the shock front, 
this front face i s loaded by a " reflected pressure spike." As the shock 
front passes over the structure ~ the reflected pr e ssure rapidly decreases. 
The duration of the reflected pressure is a function of the initial peak 
overpressure and the dimensions of the face. The front face loading is 
subsequently caused by the ambient overpressure (similar to a hydrostatic 
pressure) of the blast wave and by the dynamic pressure of the blast wave 
due to the translational air movement within the blast wave, similar to the 
drag loading of wind forces. 
As the shock front passes over the structure, the roof and side-
wall surface s are pr ogressively loaded until it reaches the back face of 
the structur e, at which time roof and sidewalls are fully loaded. The 
back face is not loaded until the shock front r eaches the back of the 
structure, and the loading is progressively built up as the shock front 
spills over from the roof and around from the sidewalls. The r oof, s ide-
wall, and back face loadings are functions of the overpressure and the 
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dynamic pressure existing within the blast wave. While the dynamic 
pressure increases the loading on the front face, it decreases the loading 
on the roof, sidewalls, and back face. 
The exterior walls and roof surfaces must be designed to resist 
these loads. The structural elements supporting these surfaces must in 
turn be designed for the reactions of the exterior elements. However, 
these reactions will not equal the loading on the exterior surfaces because 
of the dynamic nature of the loading and response of the exterior surfaces. 
In the design of any supporting system, the net horizontal loading (the 
front face loading minus the back face loading) must also be considered. 
After the back face has been loaded, the overpressure components of the 
loadings on the front and back faces are essentially that caused by the 
dynamic pressure or drag. 
The loading on an aboveground enclosed structure is dependent 
on the areas of the exposed exterior surfaces, the overpressures, and the 
associated dynamic pressure. 
b. At the opposite end of the spectrum from the totally enclosed 
structures is the open-frame structure without any wall covering, or with 
light, frangible walls (e.g., glass, asbestos, light steel, or aluminum 
panels) which shatter on impact and transmit only a small or negligible 
load t<;> the supporting frame. In such a frame structure, only the indivi-
dual structural elements of the frame are subjected to the blast wave, 
For both the framing elements and the slabs (roof and floor), 
the overpressure is essentially balanced on all sides, and the primary 
blast loading on the structural members of an open-frame structure 
consists o{ the drag loading resulti;ng from the dynamio pres~ure of the 
bl~st w~ve. Furthermore, depending on the rel~tive size and spacing 
of the individual elements, e.g., columns, bracing, etc., the various meJD.-
bers tend to shield each other to some extent from the full effects of the 
blast wave, and thus reduce the loading. 
Therefore, the loading on the elements of an open frame struc-
tu:t;"e is dependent on the area of the exposed members and the dynamic 
pressure. Since the area of the exposed elements of an open-frame 
structure is only a small percentage of the exposed wall area of an e~ ... 
closed building, and since the dynamic pressure is relatively small com,-
pared to the overpressure of the blast wave, the loading is much less than 
for the enclosed structure. However, the increased mass and strength of 
the latter partially compensate for the increased load. 
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c. A belowground garage would either be located under an open 
area such as a plaza or park, or in the basement area of an aboveground 
garage or other buildingo The only s ignificant difference in the loading 
would be that on the roof s labo The s ide walls and floor slab would be 
subjec_ted to the same type of loadings in both cases. 
A belowground garage under an open area would generally have 
a maximum earth cover of only a few feet , which would be insufficient to 
develop arching action and for any s ignificant attenuation of the pressure 
to occur. With the roof slab flush with the ground surface or having only 
a few feet of ear th cover, it is subjected essentially to the overpressure 
of the blast wave, without any contribution from reflected overpressure 
or from the dynamic pressure. 
If a building is s ituated above the belowground garage, the 
roof slab loading on the garage depends on whether the building is enclosed 
or open. If the building is completely enclosed, the loading on the garage 
roof slab would approach zero, whereas if the building is open, the roof 
slab loading would be essentially that of the blast wave overpressure. The 
loading on the interior foundation of a closed building may be equal to or 
even greater than on the foundations of an open building. 
Since the loading on the sidewalls of a belowground structure 
is dependent on the coupling between the soil and the structural element 
itself, the wall loadings will be a function of the physical properties of 
the soil (e.g., soil type, density, degree of compaction, placement proce-
dure, the value of the horizontal stress component in the soil) and the 
mass and stiffness of the walls. If the sidewalls are fairly stiff, the lateral 
loadings are increased; if the sidewalls are relatively flexible, the loadings 
are decreased. The soil-structr; interaction problem is very complex 
and must be evaluated for each design situation. The supporting 
structural system is, of cour se, in turn loaded by the reactions of the 
sidewalls as they respond to their loadings. Depending upon the pres-
sure level, the s tructure will be subjected to various levels of acceleration 
and displacement. 
A partially buried garage structure will be subjected to loadings 
similar to that of an enclosed aboveground garage structure, except for 
those portions of the sidewalls below grade line. If the cover is mounded 
around the portions of the sidewalls above the grade line, the resulting 
aerodynamic shape is impr oved, resulting in decreased drag loadings 
on these upper portions of the s idewallso In addition9 the increased mass 
of the earth cover probably would decrease the response of the sidewalls~ 
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4-5.3 Structural Layout 
The general structural layout of a garage is based on the park-
ing requirements of the automobiles or a projection of the structural grid 
of the superstructure when the garage is part of another structure. 
In a rectangular structure, shear walls are generally superior 
in performance to rigid frames and may be less expensive. However, the 
large openings required to facilitate car movements greatly reduce the 
effectiveness of shear walls. Shear walls could be used near the entrancee 
and other facilities where open space is not demanded. 
Arches and domes are superior structural shapes because of 
their inherent structural strength and their better aerodynamic charac-
teristics which result in reduced structural loadings. However, it is 
generally inadvisable to use them for parking garages since the volume 
ore a ted cannot be fully utilized and their construction cost is higher. 
Either flat-slab or T-beam construction may be used, but the economy of 
headroom requirements makes the flat slab more desirable. Long sp~ns 
should be eliminated wherever possible. 
4-5.4 Blast-resistant Design Considerations 
In blast-resistant design, there are three considerations which 
are significantly different from the commonly accepted design procedures 
of structures designed for conventional loads. (1) The increased loading 
rates on structural materials under the dynamic loads experienced in 
blast- resistant design generally result in increased material strengths, 
particularly in the yield of steel. (2) The inertia forces tend to reduce the 
resistance required of a structure and/ or structural element to withstand 
a giv~n level of load. (3) Structures have a large reserve of load-carrying 
capabilities beyond yield when they are designed to be ductile, i.e., capable· 
of c;leflecting within the plastic range of behavior. However this is much 
less important for long duration loads as opposed to short duration loads. 
Procedures for blast-resistant design recognize all three of 
these considerations. Preliminary design can be based on static resis-
tance equal to the peak applied force using static yield resistances. 
However, the final design should be checked in accordance with blast-
;resistant design procedures in order to insure that the response is 
acceptable. 
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4-6 Openings, Entrances,_ and Ramps 
4-6.1 
Openings and entrances are particularly critical elements in 
garage-shelter design. The· ventilation, pedestrian, and large vehicular 
openings in an enclosed parking garage require special attention. Since 
blast pressures on the order of 5 pounds per square inch can cause rup-
ture of eardrums, seriously damage · vehicles, interior partitions, and 
furnishings~ and destroy ventilation systems, it is desirable to completely 
exclude the blast wave. For ventilation systems, either a manual or an 
automatic blast closure device is satisfactory. The large openings must 
· be secu~e.ly and positively closed prior to the arrival of the blast wave. 
Automatic actuation is not 'rapid enough to provide protection. Filtration 
of the incoming air after an attack would generally be required. 
;::-~: ·;1 ·~ ." '· 
4-6.2 Blast Effects 
When an air. :blast e_nters a tunneled entrance or an air duct, a 
lnew wave front is'·'gener.apy formed inside the tunnel and the shock pro-
.. pogates _itself througJ::l the entrance .9r duct. Considerable research ha~ 
been done on the problem of the entry of shock waves into tunnels and the 
subsequent behavior of these waves in various tunnel configurations ... 
Because of the tremendous energy and the long durations of blast waves 
resulting fEom nuclear explosions, the lengths and/ or configurations of 
parking garage entrances .are not sufficient to provide other than a very 
minor attenuation of the pressures in the blast wave. Baffles and tortuous 
paths, although effective for reducing pressures from conventional high-
explosive detonations,. are ineffective for a nuclear explosion. Theret~re, 
a positive closure of tP.Y..J~r_ge 9P~nings is required. 
A through-ramp entrance, either open or covered, which can be 
entered from either end with the closure offset in a leg at right angles 
has definite advantage.· ~There are no reflecting surfaces and the door is 
subject~d essentially only to overpressure. (Figure 4-1 e and f) 
- For ~:t" no~-thr~ugh ramp: entrance, a roofless ramp is best 
However, if a covered ramp is required and turns are permissible, the 
pressure wiH be s_ignificantly reduced if the closure door is placed along 
the sidewall =·. r~~her th~an H'l tl;le ·end wall. , (FigUre 4-ld) 
"If'"'... :.. ' . 
4-6.3 · Radiation Shielding 
Entranceways should be shielded in such a manner that the 
contribution through the entranceway is minimized. Baffles, either 
interior or exterior, and right-angle turns are quite effective in reducing 
the contribution through entranceways. Closed or covered entrance ramps 
are preferred in that they not only provide additional attenuating mass, 
but also remove a contaminated plane from being immediately adjacent 
to the structure and provide a "tunnel" which further decreases the con-
tribution received within the garage from other sources. 
In order to minimize the fallout drifting down the ramp and 
lying against the structure and possibly the door, pits with open grilles 
in the ramp floor are recommended to trap the contamination. 
4-6.4 Entrance Doors 
Incorporating effective barriers to the blast front at the large 
vehicle openings is one of the main structural, architectural, and m.echani-
cal problems. The major expense and intricate detailing involved in pro-
viding a massive operating door that will remain operable is probably the 
critical design item in this type of blast shelter. Because of the expense 
of blast doors, they may be omitted from the initial construction, but 
the designer should plan the entrance closure details in advance. 
Horizontal blast doors which would only be subjected to side-on 
overpressures may be used for the small openings normally used by 
pedestrians entering and leaving the structures. 
Doors should be generally located so they are not subjected to 
reflected pressures. However, since the openings are smaller vertically 
than horizontally for ramped entrances, vertical doors should be used 
in this case. (Figure 4-la) The designer should also consider installing 
separate doors for each lane of traffic in order to reduce the size of the 
door to be operated. 
Large doors may be either hinged or sliding. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to each type. To gain maximum support 
against the positive blast phase, a top-hinged door would swing out and 
the structure used to resist movement of the door. The negative phas~, 
assumed to assert a force equal to 50 percent of the positive pressure 
in the opposite direction, must be resisted by a series of bolts or pins. 
The simpler support system for an outswinging door must be balanced 
against the problems of opening the shelter door into the direction of 
traffic under emergency conditions. Horizontal sliding doors operate 
slower and require more energy to close than vertical sliding doors. 
As in the case of hinged doors, resistance to one phase of pressure 
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can be obtained from the structure while some device must be installed 
for the opposing action. A door sliding into a recess presents the 
special problem of maintenance since the recesses would probably be 
inaccessible. 
Exposed parts of the door mechanism may be damaged by heat, 
fragments, rubble and dust. When the site or neighboring structures 
places the door in a vulnerable situation, it is preferable to locate the 
closure within the protected area of the shelter. In addition to direct 
weapon effects, the operating mechanism may be subject to very large 
forces transmitted from the door. The door mechanism should be 
isolated from these forces by supporting the door independent of the 
rollers or other elements of the operator. 
Operation of the doors will require a power source. Small doors 
may be operated by hand or by an integral power source such as com-
pressed springs, explosive cartridge, or power cylinder, but large doors 
may require a large power source for a short period of time. An emer-
gency power source such as counterweighting, hydraulic-pneumatic 
accummulators or standby generators should be provided. 
4-6.5 Ventilation Openings 
Large shelters require a forced ventilation system con&isting 
of air intake and exhaust passages and the means to circulate air. A 
blqst valve or other mechanism restricting the flow of blast through these 
air passages is desirable~ Manually operated air handling units are 
generally impractical because of the volume of air to be changed and the 
corresponding static air pressures required. In addition, quantities of 
air for cooling and for combustion will be required for any gasoline- or 
diesel-engine driven generators. 
The ducts required to provide a minimum acceptable air flow 
will be reasonably small. These ducts may be incorporated as part of 
the entrance system, in which case adQ.itional fallout baffling is minimized. 
Alternatively, the ducts may lead directly from the shelter to intakes on 
the ground surface. In this case, sufficient bends or baffling must be pro-
vided to eliminate direct penetration of radiation. In addition, a small 
structure on the ground surface would be required to protect the entrance 
from debris and snow. It is recommenQ.ed that blast valves be located 01;1 
the interior ends of these ducts so that the valves are convenient for 
maintenance during an emergency. Blast valves to close the passage to 
blast pressures may be operated remotely by blast, light, or radiation 
sensors and by auxiliary power sources or by the blast itself. 
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The volume of air :required by the emergency generators may be 
larger than that required for the sheltered personnel.. Although locating 
the generator within the shelter area makes it accessible for maintenance, 
the increased cost of installing protected supply and exhaust ducts m.ay be 
prohibitive. It is usually better to locate the generators outside of the 
shelter, but convenient to the shelter. In an outside area, normal air 
circulation will provide sufficient cooling and combustion air .. Standard 
engine generators can be modified to withstand low--level blast pressures, 
but should be shielded against radiation contamination as much as possible 
to allow for maintenance. (Figure 4-lf) 
4-7 .Mechanical and Electrical Equipm.ent 
4-701 General 
A closed parking garage J.s notable both as a massive structural 
building as well as having an extenslve ventilating systemo An open-air 
parking garage lacks enclosing walls and mechanical ventilating or heat-
ing system.. Depending upon height and size, either type of garage might 
be equipped with an automatic sprinkler system. but probably would not 
be equipped with extensive water supply or sanitary facili.ties~ Lighting 
levels are generally very low 1n all garageso 
Effect of Larg·e Volu~. 
It is probably a unique characteristic of a parking garage that 
there is a large unobstructed air volume compared to most spaces availa~ 
ble as fallout shelters .. There a.re very few lntermediate partitions or 
closed-off spaces .. Due to the interconnecting ramps and the large parking 
and turnaround areas, there will probably be large open spaces available for 
occupancy even though the garage contains a large num·ber of autos at the 
time of use. Andp the spaces within and on top the autos may be used even 
i.f autos are occupying the garageo Consequently, the free volume per 
occupant will probably be large enough to control carbon dioxide 
concentration and to i.nsure sufficient oxygen content for extended periods 
without mechanical ventilation. An open-·air garage would have to be closed 
with tarpaulins (or other type of screening} to prevent dust penetration, 
but would allow some iil.filtration air 9 depending upon wind direction and 
velocity .. Infiltration would be undesirable when there are high concentra--
tions of radioactive dust i.n the atmosphere, but after this period it would 
be of some advantage .. 
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4-7.3 Supply and Exhaust Fan and Filter Room 
The supply fan and filter must be installed in a separately en-
closed and shielded room. The fan system should be provided with a 
bypass that can be used during emergencies to filter out the smaller dust 
particles in a more efficient manner than would be required for the normal 
use of the building. Consequently, the main fan must either be selected 
so that the reduced output associated with higher filter resistances will 
still be sufficient for the use of the space, or a separate booster fan must 
be combined with the additional filters. Spare filters must be stored in an 
accessible and clean area so that they may replace the primary filters in 
case the first set is damaged during the initial stages of a nuclear attack. 
There should be at least two extra sets of filters to allow for possible 
blast damage. The air intake should be shielded so as to prevent direct 
wind pressure from forcing dust into the opening~ and the air intake should 
be turned down so that the air must rise up into the opening 9 leaving the 
larger and heavier particles of dust on the outside. If blast is to be a 
consideration9 some form of blast valve should be considered and some 
form of expansion chamber inside the ventilating air inlet should be pro-
vided to reduce the overpressure at the filter and at the supply fan. 
4-7.4 Emergency Power 
A typical commercial garage would not have emergency power 
available and would not normally have major heating or cooling equipment. 
Emergency power could be provided by a small gasoline- or diesel-engine-
driven generator. Although gasoline storage poses some problems in 
deterioration, a gasoline engine generator is less expensive and somewhat 
easier to start than a diesel generator. In addition, most people are 
somewhat familiar with gasoline engines and a mechanic is likely to be 
available among the occupants in case of emergency. Spare parts might 
be found among the many automobiles; and extra gasoline could be obtained 
from the parked automobiles 9 if necessary. The only emergency power 
requirement would be the central supply fan and the building lighting. 
The exahust system would not be operated in order to allow the supply 
system to maintain a positive air pressure within the building to assist 
in excluding dusty infiltration air and other contaminates. 
The emergency generator should be located reasonably close to 
the supply air fan since this is the major load that it would serve. The 
main building lighting panel should also be located as close as possible 
to the generator. The generator should preferably be in a protected and 
non-contaminated area and should have sufficient air supply to satisfy 
its cooling needs. If this is not possible, a remote air-cooled radiator 
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should be considered so that the generator and its maintenance personnel 
would not be contaminated by the large quantities of air required for cool-
ing. The water would have to contain anti-freezeo 
The fuel supply must be located nearby and in a protected enclo-
sure to insure that .thermal radiation or blast does not damage the fuel supply 
system. Generally speaking, this would imply that the fuel supply should 
be on the lower floor or below ground, and the electrical generator would 
be somewhere in this vicinity. It is possible to supply the fuel by pump to 
higher levels. However, this not only consumes electrical power, but it 
provides another possibility for mechanical failure. 
4-7.5 Water for Human Consumption 
Fresh drinking water would not normally be available in any 
large quantity except on the ground floor level, and only if the garage con-
tained public eating and lobby facilities. Therefore, an emergency water 
supply must be stored either in emergency containers on each floor or 
in some central storage facility. If the building contains a sprinkler 
system, · it could be used as an emergency source of supply, however it 
would probably be of the dry- pipe type, since the building is generally 
unheated. A storage tank on the top floor, or in a penthouse on the 
roof, would insure a minimum supply of water for the sprinkler system 
without relying on electrical driven pumps which could fail in case of 
emergency. Under these conditions, water could be made available on 
each floor through a simple emergency hose bibb arrangement. The 
storage tank must normally be heated to prevent freezing. 
4-7.6 Water for Waste Disposal 
A typical garage will not have toilet facilities on each floor; 
however, emergency containers and chemical toilets could be provided 
for emergency use. The automobiles will contain large quantities of 
water in their radiators if there are automobiles in the garage at the time 
of occupancy. This water can be used for basic washing and cleansing 
purposes, and for general decontaminating purposes, even if it is not fit 
for human consumption. 
4-7.7 Normal Lighting 
The lighting levels in a parking garage are usually of such low 
level that the entire building lighting system could probably be operated 
by the emergency generator. The one exception would be advertising 
signs using large quantities of electrical current. The only other major 
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electrical load would be the elevators in a multi-story garage. During an 
emergency 9 these would be shut oft Therefore, the emergency generator 
would only serve the supply fan and the minimum building lighting system. 
4-7.8 Emergency Lighting 
An emergency lighting system designed for 6 and/ or 12 volt 
power supply could be provided in addition to the normal lighting system. 
This would allow the use of batteries from the automobiles as required 
(and if available). However~ if automobiles are available, the headlights 
and taillights are probably sufficient for emergency usee 
Mass Fire 
In case of a mass fire, the fresh air ventilating system would 
have to be turned off temporarily to guard against entry of noxious and 
dangerous fumes, smoke, and carbon monxide. The fresh air intake 
should be properly located and designed with thi s in mind. However, the 
large volume of interior space should be sufficient to maintain livability 
for a period of a few days without a forced air supply. The space would 
become warm and humid due to human occupancy, but the mass of the 
building would absorb some of the heat and the rate of temperature rise 
would be reasonably slow. Naturally, an underground space would be better 
suited as a shelter in an area of mass fire; however, there is no reason 
to believe that a windowless garage would not endure mass fire without' 
collapse and with reasonable safety for the occupants, assuming that 






The following examples are included to show various parking 
garage designs which incorporate some degree of protection. As well 
as illustrating various garage types and ramping systemst comment is 
made on the probable location of each type. For shelter purposest the 
structures are reviewed for special thermal and structural resistance 
incorporated in the design and for adaptability as shelter area in a 
period of radioactive fallout. 
5-2.1 
5-2 Open Air Type 
(Example A, Figures 5-l, 2, 3, 4) 
Architectural Description 
This design, representative of the most common type of com-
mercial parking garage, is usually constructed by private interests in 
the center of large cities or is built by the municipality and leased to 
another party for administration. 
A ramp system is used for vertical circulation in the eight-story 
fireproof structure illustrated. It is assumed to be an attendant-operated 
garage, with the first floor devoted to customer facilities. The structural 
system is reinforced concrete, and a bay size of 28' x 24' was selected 
to accommodate three cars per bay .. 
5-2.2 Mechanical System 
Since this is an open-air garage, no mechanical ventilation is 
required. Heating is limited to offices and facilities on the first floor. 
However, with only minor expense, gas-fired unit heaters can be installed 
and, if the vehicle openings are temporarily closed, the shelter space could 
be heated and become usable in the wintero 
Most codes require a building of this height and area to be 
equipped with a sprinkler system. Since the building is unheated, a dry-
pipe system with a heated reservoir on the roof is recommended. 
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5-2.3 Thermal and Blast Resistance 
Damaging thermal pulses will not be sufficiently reduced unless 
special attention is given to a screening device for the openings. Though 
the structure will not burn, a fire hazard exists since the automobiles 
may ignite. 
As an open-air building the structure exposes a minimum area 
to the blast forces, making the structure itself less vulnerable to blast 
pressur es than an enclosed structure. To further reduce the impulse 
loading transmitted to the frame, frangible siding could be installed. It 
is not practical to modify this structure to protect occupants from blast 
pressures. 
5-2.4 Shelter Consider ations 
This type of garage could serve best as a fallout shelter. 
Temporary closing methods, such as the installation of vinyl sheets over 
the openings must be used to prevent drifting of fallout material into the 
shelter areas. The closure must be installed after the blast has passed, 
since these areas would be vulnerable to blast pressure. If some con-
taminated material entered the structure before closing, the sprinkler 
system could be used for decontamination. 
Assuming no mutual shielding from neighboring structures, no 
contamination within the structure from drifting, and a negligible mass 
thickness for the exterior walls, the interior bay of the garage shown has 
protection factors above 40 for all floors except the ground floor. The 
third to seventh floors have pr otection factors of more than 100 in the 
central bay and over 40 in the two adjacent interior bays. A structure 
of the same general dimensions and capacity, but without the staggered 
floo r system of ramping, would not provide as high a protection factor in 
the center bay. Ideally, the automobiles in the garage should be moved 
to those areas on the perimeter where protection factors are low. Doing 
this would free more area for shelter purposes and provide some addi-
tional mass shielding in the more exposed areas. 
An emergency stand-by generator, located in a pit below the 
central aisle, is suggested for emergency lighting. Shelter supplies could 
be stored in an underground storage room opening off the generator pit. 
Both the equipment and storage areas could be located in the half-story 
space under the center slab if the structure is not intended to withstand 
blast pressures. 
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5-3.1 
· 5...:3 Underground Type 
(Example B, Figures 5-5 9 6," 7) 
Architectural Description 
The under ground garage illustrated is typical of those included 
in major central business district projects or in urban renewal areas 
where an attempt is made to conceal automobile parking. The area above 
the garage is an open paved piazza, which enhances the area. If the 
garage is i.n an urban renewal area, the park-like green space could serve 
as a recreation area for the neighborhood. 
In the scheme illustrated, it assumed that the customer pays a 
fee but parks his own vehicle. The number of floors may be limited by 
problems of excavation, but three floors are shown in this solution. 
Because customer parking is used, the structural bay s ize is 
increased above minimum standards to a 28' x 26' bay t allowing slightly 
more space to maneuver the vehicles. 
5-3.2 Mechanical System 
As an underground structure is completely enclosed, forced 
ventilation is used throughout the entire structure. Heating, however, 
is limited to the control areas near the vehicle entrances. 
The fresh air intakes are housed in the structures over the four 
pedestrian entrances. Fan rooms are located in the first level below 
grade. One of these fan rooms could also house a generator for emer-
gency use. 
In this design, it is assumed that the sprinkler system is a wet-
pipe system fed by the city supply. 
5-3.3 Thermal and Blast Resistance 
Since the structure is underground, the effects of thermal 
radiation will be negligible on the structure, vehicles, and personnel, 
Blast effects on the structure are minimized, and protection of personnel 
can be accomplished by some modification. 
Blast closures at the openings are the only major modifications 
required by this structure. Commercially developed devices are available 
for passage doors and openings for the mechanical equipment9 but at the 
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vehicle openings massive doors will be required. Opposi~g ramps are 
used, and the entrance door s are at r ight angles to the ramps in order 
to minimize blast pressurese 
5-3.4 Shelter Considerations 
With no ground radiation contribution except the small amount 
gained through the heavy overhead barrier, the scheme represents an 
almost ideal solution to shielding from nuclear radiation. Again, the 
major shielding problem involves the large openings of the ramp. Assum-
ing no contamination within the structure from drifting, and when the 
overhead barrier consists of an 8- inch reinforced concrete slab, a pro-
tection factor of 50 is reached on the upper level away from direct 
contribution through the entrance. Increasing the overhead barrier to a 
12- inch concrete slab raises the protection factor to 200. Using an 8-inch 
slab combined with 2 feet of earth fill 9 the upper level parking area 
becomes a shelter area with a protection factor in excess of 5000. The 
second and third. floors below grade are sufficiently baffled by the ramp . 
sequence, and the only special consideration is that of temporarily 
enclosing the space to exclude drifting fallout particles. If the structure 
is intended to be used as a fallout shelter only and no provision is made 
to close off the entrances to the ramps, the exhaust system would be 
shut down during shelter occupancy and air forced out vehicle entrances 
to eliminate drifting of fallout dust into shelter area. 
If all vehicles are evacuated from this garage, the possible 
shelter occupancy would exceed 30,000 and a considerable area must, 
therefore, be assigned to house emergency supplies. It recommended 
that these supplies be stockpiled in the least convenient parking stalls 
on the lowest level. Construction cost of a special storage area would be 
approximately the same as additional parking space, and the space under 
ramps would only accommodate part of the supplies. 
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FIGURE 5-7 SECTION OF BUILDING 11 8 u 
5-4.1 
5-4 Office Building Base 
(Example C, Figures 5-8 , 9, 10) 
Architectural Description 
This examp e is typical of the many new high- rise office buildings 
where parking i s provided on the lower levels of the structure. The 
stepped platforms in this scheme form a transitional element between the 
office tower and the open square. Three levels of parking are located in 
the platforms. 
The structural system of the office building above has an influence 
on the structural bay size of the garage below. The long spans, giving 
flexible space to the office building, project into the parking area. 
Mechanical System 
The open-air arage is large enough to require mechanical 
ventilation. The office building above has heating and cooling equipment 
located on several levels, including one at the lowest floor above the lobby. 
Water for the sprinkler system is supplied from a tank on the 
roof of the office building. 
Thermal and Blast Resistance 
As an open-air structure, the garage structure itself is not 
susceptible to overpressures except on the roof area. However, the super-
structure will be subjected to reflected overpressures. Because of its 
openness, the garage structure will not completely shield occupants or 
vehicles from thermal radiation, but in a downtown area considerable 
shielding will be gained from neighboring structures. 
The garage area cannot be used as a shelter against blast without 
extensive modification, but the blast resistance of the structural frame can 
be increased by reducing the long spans in the parking area. Using the same 
design, but with the garage below grade, a shelter similar to example B 
is evolved, and, by the addition of blast doors, shelter from all nuclear 
effects can be gained. 
5- 4.4 Shelter Considerations 
The characteristics of the shelter are similar to example A, in 
that all openings must be closed to eliminate infiltration of fallout 
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particles. The major advantage of this structure over examples A and 
B is the convenience to the shelter of the facilities located in the building 
above. In warm climates, where air conditioning is mandatory for large 
shelters, the additional expense for air conditioning equipment would be 
eliminated. The generator to operate this equipment would be the major 
additional expense. The core area of structure above, including the 
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FIGURE 5- 10 SECTION OF BUILDING "C" 
5-5 Integral Type 
(Example D, Figures 5-11, 12, 13, 14) 
5-5.1 Architectural Description 
The integral-type parking garage, though the least common type 
of parking arrangement employed, represents a scheme exceptionally 
well suited to a shelter structure. In the example, the parking area is 
enveloped on all four sides by an office building. The same scheme would 
work for a motor hotel. A continuous, ramped floor provides vertical 
vehicular circulation and parking space. The corridor around the parking 
connects the offices directly to the parking as well as to the other facilities 
of the structure. 
Structurally, the reinforced concrete frame of the garage is inte-
gral with the office building. 
5-5.2 Mechanical System 
The garage is completely enclosed and mechanical ventilation 
is require<;!. This can be supplemented in an emergency situation by the 
heating and cooling equipment serving other areas of the building. 
5-5.3 Thermal and Blast Resistance 
The parking area is completely shielded from the thermal pulse. 
Blast pressure resistance is minimal where ~tandard office partition 
const~uction is used, and, because of the enclosing walls, the frame is 
subjected to higher loadings than example A. 
5-5.4 §helter Considerations 
The exterior wall, the office partitions, and the two corridor 
walls offer several mass barriers for radiation attenuation. 
The ramped floor with a slope of less than 5% is acceptable for 
emergency living co;nditions. 
The toilet facilities of the building ~re convenient to the sheltered 
area. 
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5-6.1 
5-6 Abovegr ound Type 
(Example E, F igures 5-15, 16, 17) 
Architectural Description 
The aboveground garage type illustrated is located among new 
apartment buildings in an urban r enewal project. It is assumed that the 
ground water level is high and aboveground construction is necessary. The 
solution frees the area used by the garage so that the land is available 
for playgrounds and green space for the residents of the area. The earth 
ramparts and landscaping also hide the unpleasant view of the parking. 
Access to the garage i s fr om the ground floor of the apartment buildings 
by means of covered connecting links. 
It is assumed that the residents park their own vehicles. Toilet 
facilities are pr ovided in the garage structure as a convenience to the 
people in the park aboveo 
A reinforced concrete flat slab is used on a structural bay 25 by 
28 feet. Baffle walls a t the entr ance are concrete bearing walls. 
5-6.2 Mechanical System 
As a completely enclosed structure, forced mechanical ventilation 
is used. No heating is provided except in the toilet facilities. 
As in example B, fresh air filters are located in low penthouses 
in the parks above. 
A sprinkler system may not be available but the occupants will 
have access to the water system qf the adjoining buildingo 
5-6.3 Thermal and Blast Resistance 
As a partially buried structure, the effects of thermal radiation 
will be negligible on the structure, vehicles, or personnel. In order to 
achieve blast protection for occupants, blast doors must be installed at 
the vehicle and pedestrian entrances and the ventilation openings. 
Vulnerability of the large doors to blast pressures can be reduced by 
designing the automobile appr oaches with right-angle bends. 
Shelter Considerations 
The car s within the garage can be easily moved outside the 
5-22 
structure since no ramps are involved and the road approaches and grounds 
provide adequate space for storing the vehicles without using any street 
parkingo The dirt fill above the shelter and banked against the walls 
provides excellent mass shieldingo Under emergency conditions~ baffle 
walls are provided at the entrance to limit radiation penetration into the 
sheltero In areas away from direct contribution through the entrances, 
and assuming no contamination from drifting ~ the protection factors are 
in excess of 5000 . As radiation intensities decrease , the occupants can 
move into areas of the ad joining apartment buildingo 
5-23 
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FIGURE 5 - 17 SECTION OF BUILDING II E II 
5-7.1 
5-7 Residential Type 
(Example F, Figures 5-18, 19) 
Architectural Description 
In the fringe areas of large cities, enclosed parking facilities 
of the many new low-rise apartment buildings offer good possible shelter 
locations. In the scheme illustrated here, the garage is in a half-basement 
beneath the dwelling units. Parking space for five cars is provided for 
six units. The remaining basement area is used for storage, mechanical 
equipment, and lal.lndry facilities. 
A reinforced concrete slab supported on masonry bearing walls 
forms the structural system and defines the shelter in the basement area. 
5-7.2 Mechanical System 
The garage area is unheated. The heating and air conditioning 
units for the apartments are within the shelter area and could be used in 
emerg~ncy conditions. 
As conventionally designed, the mechanical syst~m would pro-
haply limit the capacity of the shelter. Improvements for the shelter 
would include installation of a generator as well as fans an.d filters. 
5-7~3 Thermal and Blast Resistance 
The direct effects of thermal radiation wUl be negligible. 
Blast resistance of the shelter is minimal. 
5-7.4 Shelter Considerations 
A radiation barrier to ground contribution is provided by the 
planting area. The structure itself li:uJ.its the overhead contribution. No 
permanent mass barrier is located at the vehicle entrance doors~ How-
ever, the plane of contamination is limited to the driveway area. This 
area may be covered with vinyl or canvas o~ a trellis arrangement to 
prevent an excessive accumulation of fallout debris. Alternately, the 
drive may be decontaminated or, by using solid concrete blocks stored on 
the site, a temporary mass barrier may be erected in the openings by the 
shelterees. The protection factor in the laundry-storage area is above 
200 without any improvements to the openings. If the temporary wall 
is erected, the protection factor in the garage can be raised from 25 to 
100. 
5-27 
Approximately 150 people can be shelter ed in eac basement area 
assigned to six apartments . The shelter can thus be used by the surround-
ing neighborhood as well as the occupants of the apartment units. 
5=28 
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FIGURE 5- 19 ELEVATION AND SECTION OF BUILDING II F II 
APPENDIX A 
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The material presented herein is an introduction to nuclear 
weapons effects. More complete information may be obtained from 
"The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," U. S~ Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D. c. 20402, and Professional Manuals of the Office of Civil 
·Defense Technical Publications Program. 
The material is limited to blast overpressures of less than 25 
pounds per square inch (psi), and accompanying levels of initial nuclear, 
thermal, and fallout radiation. 
A-1 General 
All types of explosions ~ industrial, high explosives, and nuclear 
weapons -release a tremendous amount of energy within a relatively 
confined space over a very short interval of time. This energy release 
is largely in the form of heat energy; a portion appearing as a flash of 
light and a heat wave9 and a portion converting the explosion products 
into high-temperature gases. Since these gaseous products are initially 
ponfined within a small volume, tremendous pressures exist. As the hot 
gases expand, a blast wave is developed which propagates outward from 
the center of the explosion. This blast wave is similar to a rapidly 
moving wall ofwater. As the wave speeds along, it first smashes against 
an object, then engulfs it with a squeezing action, and, finally, attempts 
to drag the object with a racking action. The vaporization of material 
when the fireball has touched the earth's surface, and the removal of 
material by the blast wave and winds accompanying the explosion, can 
result in the formation of a crater. The size of the crater wUl vary with 
the size of the weapon, height of 'burst, and the character of the soil. 
The total energy release of a nuclear explosion is many thousand 
times that of a conventional high explosive, thus extending by many orders 
of magnitude the destructive range of thermal energy and blast wave. In 
addition, the n-uclear explosion is accompanied by two entirely unique 
weapon effects. These are the initial nuclear radiation and the radio-
active fallout. Whereas the effects of a conventional weapon are signifi-
cant only within several hundred feet of the detonation, the tremendous 
energy release and the fallout of a single nuclear we~pon make its effects 
significant for several hundred miles. Thus, weapons effects are no longer 
a point problem but an area problem. 
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Because of these fundamental differences, the effects of nuclear 
weapons acquire special s "gnificance in architectural and engineering 
planning. 
A-2 Yield of a Nuclear Weapon 
The size of a nuclear weapon is referred to as its yield. A 
one-kiloton (1 KT) nuclear weapon releases an amount of energy equiva-
lent to that released by 1,000 tons of TNT; a one-megaton (1 MT) nuclear 
weapon releases energy equivalent to 1~000,000 tons of TNT. Nuclear 
weapons have been detonated with energy releases ranging from a fraction 
of a kiloton through the 20- kiloton weapons detonated over Japan in 1945 
to multi-megaton weapons detonated in nuclear tests conducted during 
the past several years. 
In the explosion of a nuclear weapon9 the distribution of energy 
is determined by both the type of weapon (fission, fission-fusion) and the 
location (air, surface, sub-surface) of the burst. While the fission pro-
cess maximizes the nuclear r adiation effects, the fusion process maxi-
mizes the blast and thermal effects. An air burst below 100,000 feet 
tends to maximize the blast, th~rmal radiation, and initial nuclear radia-
tion, while minimizing the fallout radiation. A surface burst maximizes 
the fallout radiation, at the expense of the other effects. A sub-surface 
burst maximizes the ground-shock effect, while little thermal or nuclear 
radiation escapes. 
The distribution of energy in a typical air burst of.:-a fission (KT) 
weapon is as follows ~ About 85 percent is in the form of heat energy, of 
which about 50 percent produces blast and shock, and 35 percent appears 
as thermal radiation (heat and light rays); 5 percent constitutes the 
jnitial nuclear radiation produced within the first minute after an explo-
sion; and 10 percent is fallout radiation emitted over a much longer 
period. 
A- 3 Blast Effects 
Although normal building loads are usually given in pounds per 
square foot (psf. 1 psi = 144 psf), blast pressures are expressed in 
pounds per square inch (psi). Inasmuch as conventional lateral loads, 
e.g. wind loads, are from about 20 psf (0.14 psi) to 50 psf (0.35 psi); and 
normal vertical loads, e.g. floor loads, are from 40 psf (0.28 psi) to 100 
psf (0. 70 psi), even low levels of blast pr essure (2 psi to 10 psi) are over-
whelming. 
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In considering the destructive effect of the blast wave, the two 
most important characteristics are U.) the overpressure (the .pressure 
greater than atmospheric pressure caused by the compression of the air 
within the blast wave) and ~2) the dynamic pressure (the wind pressure 
caused by the motion of the ai r particles behind the blast front). Most 
conventional structures will be damaged to some extent when the over-
pressure is about 1 to" 2 psi 9 although glass windows will usually shatter 
at lower pressures. 
When the blast wave encounters a building, there is at first a 
blast pressure on the front faceo This is followed by a gradual unloading 
on the front face as the blast wave progresses past the face and sequen-
tially loads the roof and sides 9 then the back faceo 
As the blast wave travels from the center of explosion, the over-
pressure at the front steadily decreases due to the increased volutne of 
the pressure "bubbleo" The overpressure acts equally in all directions 
and tends to compress or squeeze any object engulfed by the blast wave. 
The dynamic pressure 9 which is caused by the motion of the air particles 
behind the blast front, acts in the direction of movement of the blast wave 
and tends to drag any engulfed objecto 
The difference in the air pressures outside and inside a building 
can cause damageo After the blast wave has completely engulfed a build-
ing, not only will the building walls and roof experience this pressure 
difference, but also the frame of the building will be subjected to a drag 
force caused by the dynamic pressureo 
The structural damage sustained by a building will depend on the 
relationship of the loading to the stuructural strength and rigidityg This 
structural strength and rigidity ·wnl in turn depend upon the basic 
structural system9 materials of constru.ction9 sizing of individual elements, 
connection d.etails 9 etc. The blast loading will depend upon the size and 
location of the nuclear weapon detonation and the building size, shape, 
and position. 
The blast wave can also inflict damage on exposed items such 
as utility lines and connections to the building and mechanical equipment 
installed outside the buHdingsw To prevent damage to people, material, 
and other items inside a building, it i s necessary to provide some posi-
tive method of excluding the blast from entering9 or to provide local 
protection withino The human body can survive pressures in excess of 
those required to destroy light buildingso However 9 the majority of blast 
casualties could come from secondary effects such as flying debris, 
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collapsing buildings~ and fires resulting from the partial destruction of 
buildings. These secondary effects can occur at press-ures far less than 
those required to destroy a structure. Broken windows, for example, can 
be expected for an area of over 2,000 square mHes around a 5 MT burst. 
Another aspect of the blast wave is the manner in which its 
energy is transferred into the ground 9 resulting in damage to underground 
structures and utilities. As the blast wave moves over the earth's surface, 
it exerts a downward force 9 which produces a ground shock. The strength 
of this shock at any point is determined by the soil properties and the 
overpressure of the blast wave immediately above it. At high overpres-
sures this air-induced ground shock can cause the earth surface to 
suddenly move many inches at significant levels of acceleration. How-
ever, at overpressure levels less than 25 psi , such pronounced displace-
ments are unlikely except in unusually bad soil conditions such as soft 
clay or marshy gr ound. 
A-4 Thermal Radiation 
Because of the enormous amount of energy liberated in a nuclear 
weapon, very high temperatures are attained. As a consequence of the 
high temperatures in the fireball (similar to those in the center of the 
sun), a considerable portion of the nuclear energy appears as thermal 
radiation. 
Thermal radiation can contribute to overall damage by igniting 
combustible materials. This depends upon a number of factors, the most 
important of which are the nature of the material, thickness and moisture 
content of the material, amount of thermal energy falling on a unit area 
per unit time, and total exposure time. The thermal energy from a 
specified explosion received by a given surface will be less at greater 
distances from the explosion fo~ two reasons ~ (1) the spread of the radia-
tion over an ever-increasing area as it travels away from the fireball, 
and (2) attenuation of the radiation in its passage through the air. Except 
for a small scattered component9 the thermal radiation from a nuclear 
explosion travels like light in straight lines from its source - the ball of 
fire. Any opaque material, such as a wall, a hill, or tree, located between 
the object and the fireball will act as a shield and provide protection from 
thermal radiation. Transparent materials such as glass or plastics allow 
thermal radiation to pass through only slightly reduced in intensity. 
The proportion of the energy appearing as thermal rad~ation will 
be greater for an air burst than for a surface burst where the ball of fire 
actually touches the earth or water. In a sub-surface burst, either in the 
earth or underwater9 nearly all the thermal radiation is absorbed. 
The thermal radiation is capGJ.ble of causing sklln burns on exposed 
individuals at distances from the explosion where the effects of blast and 
initial radiation are not critilcal. D].rect thermal ignition can occur over 
an area greater than 700 square mHes for a 5 MT wea_pon on a clear day. 
In addition, all the hazards of a nonnuclear fire (fire burns 9 heated air, 
noxious fumes 9 etc.) can be anticipated by occupants of a structure that 
has been ignited by thermal radiatione On cloudy days , when direct 
thermal ignitions are severely restricted. 9 secondary fires started by 
blast effects can be of major significance in an area of about 500 square 
miles. 
A-5 Nuclear Radiation 
The nuclear radiations emitted following the detonation of a 
nuclear weapon are di.vided into two categories - initial and residuaL 
The initial radiations (those emitted within one .minute after the explosion) 
consist of gamma rays and neutrons~ capable of penetrating large distances 
in air and producing injurious effects in living organisms. Residual 
radiations, or fallout (those emitted after one minute) consist of alpha 
and beta particles and gamma rays. 
A-5.1 Initial Nuclear Radi.ation 
Initial nuclear radiation 9 like the blast and thermal radiation, is 
a local effect, seriously affecting only the area within a few miles of the 
burst. For example 9 the initial nuclear radiation from a 5 MT weapon 
would probably cause no deaths to exposed individuals beyond two miles 
from ground zero, affecting an area of perhaps 12 square miles. For 
weapons above 10 KT yield 9 the leth~l range of initial nuclear radiation 
is well within the envelope of lethality for both thermal radiation and 
blast. In contrast9 the residual ~fallout) radiations can cause deaths a 
hundred or more miles away 9 thus affecting areas of over a thousand 
square miles. 
In general, a shelter with a fallout radiation protection factor1 
(pf) of 100 or more is amply shielded from initial nuclear radiation frorn 
1 The relationship bet\¥een the amount of radiation that would be received 
by an unprotected person compared to the anount he would receive if he . 
were sheltered. For example 9 a completely unprotected person would be 
exposed to 60 times more radiation than a person inside a shelter with 
· a protection factor of 60. 
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MT weapons in locations where blast overpressures are 25 psi or less. 
A-5.2 Radioactive Fallout 
When a nuclear weapon is detonated on or near the ground, so 
that the fireball contacts the ground, thousands of tons of pulverized and 
vaporized soil and other materials are carried into the atmosphere in 
the nuclear cloud.. These particles are pr opelled by a strong updraft, 
caused by the rising fireball, and will rapidly attain a great height.. For 
example, within less than ten minutes following a 5 MT surface burst, 
the cloud may reach a maximum altitude of about 15 mileso The cloud 
contains particles, many of which act as carriers of the radioactive 
sources created by the fission process .. These radioactive particles range 
in size from sand to microscopic particles .. 
Radioactive fallout is the material which is carried aloft by a 
surface or near-surface nuclear explosion and falls back to earth. The 
rate and place of fall depends on the particle 's size, shape, and weight, 
a!l-d the wind speed and direction at various altitudeso Under normal wind 
conditions, the particles of visible size will have settled to the earth 
within one dayo This material is called "early fallout" which, from a 
single nuclear explosion, can extend several hundred miles downwind 
from a surface burst and blanket thousands of square miles with deposits 
{about 1/8" thick in dangerous areas) of radioactivityo The arrival of 
fallout outside the blast area is at least one-halfhour after the blast 
and, at any given locality, can be expected to be deposited over a period 
of a few hours. The lighter particles are dispersed in the stratosphere 
and descend very slowly over large areas of the earth's surface. This is 
the "delayed fallout" which does not require radiation shields, but could 
be a long term hazard .. Air bursts do not create a fallout hazard as such, 
because no significant amount of material is made available to the radio-
isotopes to act as carrierso 
The radiation emitted by nuclear fallout primarily consists of 
beta particles and gamma rays. Beta particles have little penetrating 
effect and can be stopped by a layer of heavy clothing. Although these 
radioactive particles can cause cigarette-like burns if allowed to remain 
in direct contact with the skin, or are ingested or inhaled, they are of 
minor concern in radiation shielding designo 
Gamma rays, which are high-energy electromagnetic radiations 
lfke X-rays, are very penetrating, and their intensity determines the 
amount of shielding needed against fallout radiation. Such a shield will 
also protect against beta radiation.. For the shelter to be effective, the 
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fallout particles must be excluded fr om the pr otected a reao This may 
require the filtration of air a.nd decontamination of entering personnel. 
The basic unit of radiation exposure dose i s the roentgen (r). 
The dose ra~e 9 or intensity9 me3Lsured in r oentgens per hour (r/hr) 9 is 
the time rate at which the radiation dose is receivedQ 
The intensity of radiation fr om fallout constantly decreases or 
decays with timeo Radioactive fallout decays by approximately a factor 
of 10 for every multiple of 7 in time. For example ~ If the gamma inten-
sity is 3000 r/hr one hour after the burst9 its value 7 hours (7 x 1 hour) 
after the burst will be down to about 1/10 of 3000 or 300 r/hr ~ its value 
49 hours (7 x 7 hours) after the burst will be down to 1/10.0 of 3000 or 
30 r/hr; its value 14 days {7 x 2 days) after the burst will be down to 
1/1000 of 3000 or 3 r/hr and so on. 
A-6 Physiological Effects of Nuclear Radiations 
In gener 19 the biologiical effects of exposure to nuclear radia-
tions result from the ionization of 9 and damage to 9 molecules of body 
tissue. The nuclear radiations of primary interest in pr otective construc-
tion are the gamma rays. 
Some of the effects of nuclear radiations on living organisms 
depend not only on the total dose~ but also on the dose rate. For example, 
600 roentgens over the whole body delivered in a short time (less than a 
few days) would probably prove fatal to humanso However9 if the same 
dose were delivered over a long period {1 year) at a more or less uniform 
rate, there would pr obably be no noticeable effectso This is because most 
of the cells damaged by radiation can be replaced by new cells provided 
the rate of damage by radiation is not too hi.gho If r ecovery cannot keep 
pace with the damage 9 injury will r esult. One of the most characteristic 
features of radiation injury is the lag that usually occurs between even 
severe exposure to radiation and the development of symptoms. The 
effect of dosage rate is the r eason shielding is most important during the 










Fission Products ~ 
APPENDIX B I •; 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
The explosion of a nuclear weapon at such a height 
that the expanding fireball does not touch the 
earth's surfacee 
The luminou sphere of hot gases which forms 
a few millionths of a second after a nuclear 
explosion and immediately starts to expand and 
coot 
The loading (or force) on an object caused by the 
air blast from an explosion striking and flowing 
around the object. It is a combination of over-
pressure and dynamic pressure loading. 
A pressure pu se of air, accompanied by winds, 
propagated by an explo ion. 
The deposit of radioac ive material on the earth's 
surface nd o her exposed surfaces following a 
nuclear explosion. 
That portion of a multi-story building assigned to 
the vertic 1 elements r equired for distribution 
of mechanical services and for c ·rculation, such 
as ductshafts, pipeshafts, elevators and stairwells. 
It may also contain other spaces which are repeated 
on each floor, such as toilet rooms and janitor's 
closets. 
The decrease in activity of any radioactive 
material with the pa sage of time, due to the 
spontaneous emis ion from the atomic nuclei of 
e ither , lpha or beta particles~ sometimes accom-
panied by gamma r diat· on. 
The complex mixture of substances (about 200 
·sotope of more han 30 lements) resulting 






A burn caused by excessive exposure of bare skin 
to thermal radiation. 
The process whereby the nuclei of light elements 
combine to form the nucleus of a heavier element 
with the release of substantial amounts of energy. 
Electromagnetic radiations of high energy and 
great penetrating power originating in the atomic 
nucleus and accompanying many nuclear reactions. 
Radiation: Nuclear radiation, primarily neutrons and gamma 
rays, emitted from the fireball and the cloud 
column during the first minute after a nuclear 
explosion. 
Net Area: Space usable for human occupancy excluding walls, 
toilets, storage ~nd mechanical rooms. 
Overpressure: The transient increase in pressure in the shock 
wave of an explosion, usually expressed in pounds 
per square inch~ 
Roentgen~ A unit of exposure dose of gamma radiation. 
Shear Wall: A stiff structural element incorporated as a wall 
or part of a wall in a building and designed to be 
capable of resisting horizontal forces such as 
those due to wind, earthquake and blast. 
Shieldingr. Any material which protects personnel or materials 
from the effects of a nuclear explosion. 
Shock Wave: A pressure pulse in the surrounding air, earth 
or water initiated by the expan~ion of the hot 
gases produced in an explosion. 
Skeleton Framing: A system of construction in which the supporting 
elements of the building structure form an open 
framework and in which the exterior and interior 
walls carry no vertical load other than their own 
weight. 
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Surface Burst~ The explosion of a nuclear weapon at a height 
above the surface less than the radius of the 
firebalL 
Thermal Radiation~ Electromagnetic radiation emitted from the fireball 
as a consequence of its very high temperature, 
consisting essentially of ultraviolet, visible, and 
infrared radiationso 
Yield: The total effective ener gy (nuclear radiation, 
thermal radiation and blast) r eleas ed in a nuclear 
explosion9 usually expressed in terms of the tonnage 
of TNT r equired to release equivalent energy in an 
explosion. 
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